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INTRODUCTION
On May 30, 1942 a young man who gave his name as Clyde Sarah
was arrested by the San Leandro police. Sarah claimed that he was of
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I am grateful to G. Jack Chin, Richard
Delgado, Kathy Hartman, Greg Johnson, Peter Kwan, Natsu Saito, Frank Wu, and Scott
Wong for helpful comments and research suggestions, and to Jeffrey Allmon for his excel-
lent research assistance.
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Spanish-Hawaiian origin but had been born in Las Vegas. His parents
were deceased. He was subsequently charged with having violated federal
orders to leave that particular area. To avoid detection of his true identity,
Sarah had gone as far as obtaining rudimentary plastic surgery. It turned
out that Clyde Sarah was an alias; his real name was Fred Korematsu, and
he was a Japanese-American. Pursuant to Presidential Executive Order
9066 and military exclusion orders, all individuals of Japanese ancestry
had been required to report to internment centers.I
In 1989, the case of the Malone brothers triggered a well-publicized
inquiry into the racial and ethnic backgrounds of a number of Boston
firefighters. 2 The Malones, two fair-haired and fair-skinned identical
twins, had claimed in their job applications over twelve years earlier that
they were Black for affirmative action hiring purposes. During a job pro-
motion review, the fire commissioner was startled to learn that the
brothers' names appeared on a list of Black firefighters. Their justification
was that in 1976, after they had been passed over for jobs in the fire de-
partment and before they applied a second time, their mother had
informed them about a Black maternal great grandmother. The Malones
were eventually fired and their dismissals affirmed by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.3 Further investigations within the Boston fire
department and at fire and police departments in several other cities re-
vealed similar troubling claims about racial identity.4
In early 2005, Ward Churchill, ethnic studies chair and tenured pro-
fessor at the University of Colorado, was charged with ethnic fraud.
Churchill was an expert on indigenous issues and, according to the Den-
ver Post, had "described himself as an Indian." His opponents, however,
pointed out that he was not a regularly enrolled member in the tribe he
claimed, but rather only an "associate" member.5 Moreover, U.S. Census
records showed an ancestor whom Churchill had claimed as an American
1. PETER IRONS,JUsTICE ATWAR:THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
CASES 93-94 (1983).
2. Peggy Hernandez, Firemen Who Claimed to Be Black Lose Appeal, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 26, 1989, at 13.
3. Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, slip op. at 3 (Sup. Jud. Ct. for Suffolk County, July
25, 1989). On file with author/Vermont Law School Law Library [hereinafter Malone v.
Haley].
4. In San Francisco, a firefighter of Portuguese ancestry claimed to be Asian be-
cause he was born in the former Portuguese colony of Macao, China. Two others, who
were generally known as Italian-Americans, claimed to be Hispanic and Mexican-
American on job promotion applications. Edward Lucas, Firemen Go Back to Their Roots in
Search of Promotion, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 20, 1991, at 12.
5. Howard Pankrantz, CU Prof Affirms Indian Heritage: Tribe Says He Is Not a Full
Member, DENVER POST, Feb. 3,2005, at A-1. Some even suggested that "associate" member-
ship was only an honorary form of membership. See Stuart Steers, Churchill's Membership in
Tribe Honorary Only, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 4, 2005, at 26A. Churchill has main-
rained that his associate membership was "actual" and based in part on documented
lineage. E-mail communication with Natsu Saito, Sept. 29, 2005 (on file with author).
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Indian listed as White.6 While Churchill has continued to assert "that he is
an Indian," a claim that he has maintained since his high school days, po-
litical pressures associated with Churchill's controversial views on the
9/11 terrorist attacks triggered a university investigation into Churchill's
scholarship and other aspects of his past.8 A preliminary review suggested
that fraud in "misrepresenting himself as a Native American in order ei-
ther to gain an employment-related benefit or to add credibility and
public acceptance to his scholarship" could be sanctionable conduct.9 He
was later cleared of those charges. 0
In recent years, the practice of "box-checking:' and the abuse of af-
firmative action programs has increasingly become a concern. In such
instances, applicants for university admission and affirmative action pro-
grams "check" ethnic and racial heritage boxes indicating minority status
even if the actual personal connection is remote, tenuous, or even non-
existent. There have even been reports of systematic efforts to find such
connections via genetic analysis." It appears to be most prevalent with
respect to American Indian and Hispanic/Latino identities.1 2 While it is
unclear how often such incidents occur, they do not appear to be rare.1 3
There seem to be no formal mechanisms to challenge or check abuses
and . 14
and opportunism.
6. Kevin Flynn, Profis Genealogy is Sketchy; He Offers Little Clarification, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 5, 2005, at 4A.
7. Id.
8. Together with other law professors, I have signed a letter to University of Colo-
rado officials criticizing the investigation of Churchill as driven by political pressure and
contrary to principles of academic freedom.
9. Report on Conclusion of Preliminary Review in the Matter of Professor Ward Churchill,
University of Colorado, (Mar. 24, 2005), (on file with author) available at http://
www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/report.html.
10. Id.
11. See Amy Harmon, Seeking Ancestry in DNA Ties Uncovered by Tests, N.Y TiMEs,
April 12, 2006, at Al.
12. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous
House?, 75 N.Y U. L. REV. 283, 296 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Cornel Pewewardy & Bruce Frey, American Indian Students' Perceptions of
Racial Climate, Multicultural Support Services, and Ethnic Fraud at a Predominantly White Uni-
versity, 43 J. or AM. INDiA EDUC. 32 (2004). See also Grayson Noley, Commentary: "Ethnic
Fraud," ASAIL NoTEs,Vol. 13, No.2, Oct. 1995, p. 1.2; Dirk Johnson, Census Finds Many
Claiming New Identity, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at Al (A California contractor, "who is
one sixty-fourth American Indian, obtained $19 million in contracts set aside for minor-
ity-owned companies");John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of Overinclusion in
Affirmative Action Programs, 12 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49 (1995).
14. A small informal survey of law school admissions officers offers anecdotal evi-
dence that box-checking is usually unchallenged-in other words that the admissions
officer accepts the racial identification of the individual. Informal e-mail survey of law
school admissions officers, Nov. 8-9, 2004 (on file with author).
SPRING 2006] Choice and Fraud
Michigan journal of Race & Law
In the popular imagination, the idea of changing one's racial identity
invokes images of Eddie Murphy putting on white make-up and explor-
ing the secret privileges ofWhites on his Saturday Night Live skit "White
Like Me." 's One might also think of a recent James Bond movie, where
plastic surgery transforms the megalomaniac arch-villain from a North
Korean soldier into a White British billionaire 6 The examples are numer-
ous.17 In fact, if one broadened the protagonist's or villain's change of
identity to gender and social status, such a transformation is a common
literary plot device.
1 8
Similar to these cinematographic and other literary works, Kore-
matsu, the Malone brothers, and Churchill were engaged in their own
efforts to cross racial lines. All of their actions were self-conscious and in-
tentional efforts to identify themselves as something other than what the
general community recognized them as. Many might even say that these
individuals "misrepresented" their racial identity. From a conventional
point of view, the question that these instances of "racial misrepresenta-
tion" pose is whether it is appropriate to "lie" about, or to mis-state, one's
racial identity. They can also be seen as disputes about the permissibility of
altering one's racial identity. How should one interpret or judge such acts
as a social, moral or legal matter?
In a color-blind society, under the premise that race or skin color
are no different from personal physical attributes like hair or eye color,
alteration or misrepresentation ought to be irrelevant or of minimal con-
sequence. Accurate racial identification and classification, however, remain
crucial to the effective implementation of racial affirmative action pro-
grams and the administration of anti-discrimination laws more generally.
It remains important to the federal government's decennial census and has
continuing salience in many areas of life, such as health care.
The historical role of race in maintaining systems of slavery, segrega-
tion, and racial caste has shaped the meaning of race and methods of racial
• - 19
classification. Criticism of contemporary uses of racial classification have
15. See GAYLE WALD, CROSSING THE LINE 2-3 (2000). There is an entire genre of
"Whiteface" in film and on TV, including such recent films as WHITE CHICKS. See James
Hannaham, Beyond the Pale, NEw YORK MAG., June 28, 2004, at 98.
16. DIEANOTHER DAY (MGM 2002).
17. See generally ELAINE K. GINSBERG, PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (1996);
SusAN GuBAR, RACECHANGES:WHITE SKIN, BLACK FACE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (2000).
18. See generally GINSBERQ, supra note 17. For an illustration of "gender-passing," see
the tragic story ofTeena Brandon as depicted in the movie Boys DON'T CRY (Fox Search-
light Pictures 1999).
19. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of"Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1991); IAN HANEY-LoPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Prop-
erty, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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either denied their necessity wholesale20 or focused on the substantive
"accuracy" of classifications and designations.' Largely ignored has been
the question of process in the assignment of racial identity-who should
determi, e racial identity and the meaning of the chosen process. Who
should control the construction of the concept central to anti-
discrimination law in the present?
The acts and circumstances of individuals like the Malone brothers,
Churchill, and Korematsu raise important questions about the nature of
racial identification and its determinants. When individual choice does
not conform with community perception, which prevails and what are
the consequences? How should we understand such contradictions? To
leave such questions unresolved leaves the racial identification process
open to opportunistic manipulation by the unscrupulous. Alternatively, a
rigid system of racial classification raises the specter of South African
Apartheid or the Jim Crow Deep South. In times when society seeks to
erase racial lines and redress racial inequality, how do we manage the di-
lemma of contradictory efforts by individuals to shape and manage racial
identity?
This Article focuses on the implications of self-conscious efforts by
individuals to alter their racial identity and the challenge that they pose to
social conventions and the law. Part I will provide an overview of the
range of acts of crossing the race line and their societal significance. In
addition to surveying the historical antecedents, this part also identifies
new ways of racial passing and locates the source of discontinuity and flu-
idity of racial identity in the social construction of race. Part II considers
the two dominant methods of evaluating racial identity: individual choice
and racial fraud. It asks whether these two perspectives are adequate ana-
lytical frameworks and concludes that both perspectives pose significant
difficulties.
Parts III and IV take up a functionally driven analytical framework.
Part III identifies the different functions that racial identification serves.
Such identification can be a descriptive summary of particular physical
characteristics, an act of expressive affiliation with a particular group or
community, or a regulatory/social conclusion about the applicability of a
variety of criteria supplied by others, government or community. The lat-
ter function is most relevant to the role of race in generating social and
legal status. Finally, Part IV then considers the implications of a functional
understanding of the racial identification/classification process for affirma-
tive action and the federal decennial census. It also considers some
implications of such a framework to the promotion of a color-blind
20. See, e.g., DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX
ON CAMPUS (1991).
21. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
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society, in particular with respect to health care services and bureaucratic
records.
It should be clear that I am not so ambitious as to resolve the prob-
lem of racial classification generally, especially the substantive boundaries
of racial categories. However, a better understanding of the meaning of
the racial identification process provides useful insights into these issues.
I. CROSSING LINES OF COLOR AND RACE
A. Past Efforts to Cross Color and Race Lines
Efforts to cross color and race lines have traditionally manifested
themselves in two ways: racial passing and formal efforts to gain legal rec-
ognition of a particular racial identity, usually Whiteness.
1. Racial Passing
In the past, racial passing referred to the efforts of an individual with
non-White ancestry to hold themselves out as White when "prevailing
social standards" (or legal ones) would bar that identification.22 It was most
often, but not always, associated with individuals of mixed-race ancestry
who had "White" physical features-primarily fair skinned individuals of
African and White backgrounds.23
Prior to the Civil War, being able to pass as White facilitated the es-
cape of light-skinned slaves. For example, a racial deception enabled Ellen
Craft to flee from slavery in Georgia to freedom in Philadelphia in 1848.
She disguised herself for four days as a White man and had her husband
pretend to be her servant.14 In later times, being "mistaken" as White al-
lowed some African Americans also to avoid some of the burdens of
segregation, social stigma, and racial violence.2 s One of the most promi-
22. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 283 (2003).
23. See generally id. at 281-366.The act of passing is not unique to the race context.
Homosexuals sometimes pass as straight in order to avoid anti-gay prejudice and violence.
Gender-crossing women have disguised themselves as men to escape sexual harassment or
to avail themselves of employment opportunities. In World War II Germany, numerous
Jews passed as gentiles or converted to Christianity in order to escape persecution and the
Holocaust.
24. Id. at 286; WILLIAM CRAFT, RUNNING A THOUSAND MILES FOR FREEDOM: THE
ESCAPE OF WILLIAM AND ELLEN CRAFT FROM SLAVERY (1860). For other examples, see Elaine
K. Ginsberg, Introduction:The Politics of Passing, in GINSBERG, supra note 17, at 1.
25. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND RO-
MANCE 44-45 (2001); GREGORY HowARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE
STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) (experience of passing by
father of law dean Gregory Williams).
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nent examples includes Walter White, an active member of the NAACP
during the first half of the 20'h century. He was a "fair-skinned, blue-eyed,
and blond-haired.., son of light-complexioned Negroes who were stal-
warts of Atlanta's black middle class." 26 Using his ability to pass as White,
he investigated lynchings for the NAACP during Jim Crow times.27
Passing has not disappeared in modern day times. Prominent author
and critic Anatole Broyard, a daily book reviewer for the New York Times
for over a decade, was born to Negro parents in 1920s New Orleans; he
passed as White for most of his adult life until his death in the early
1990s. 2s Racial passing has not been unique to African Americans. Among
Asian Americans, Fred Korematsu's cosmetic surgery and pretense of be-
ing Spanish-Hawaiian may be seen as an exemplar. Erika Lee has also
described the attempts by some sojourner Chinese to disguise themselves
as American Indian or Mexican in the late 19' and early 20th century.
During the period of Chinese Exclusion, it was one of the only means
available to enter the United States via Mexico or Canada. 9 Thus,
[I]t was not uncommon for White "smugglers" to disguise
Chinese as Native Americans crossing from Canada to the
United States in pursuit of trade. They would be dressed in
"Indian garb," given a basket of sassafras, and rowed across the
border in a boat .... [For crossings to the United States from
Mexico,] Chinese [immigrants] cut their queues and ex-
changed their "blue jeans and felt slippers" for "the most
picturesque Mexican dress."They received fraudulent Mexican
citizenship papers, and they also learned to say a few words of
Spanish, in particular 'Yo soy Mexicano' ('I am Mexican')."
A U.S. immigration inspector who examined fake Mexican citizen-
ship papers of such Chinese immigrants in 1907 "expressed with some
amazement that it was 'exceedingly difficult to distinguish these China-
men from Mexicans" ,31
26. See KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 287.
27. Id. at 287-289; WALTER FWHITE,A MAN CALLED WHITE:THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WALTER WHITE (1948). But cf Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 24,
1994, at 46 (discussing other "light skin" African Americans).
28. HENRY LouIs GATES, THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT A BLACK MAN 180-214
(1997).
29. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION
ERA, 1882-1943 at 161-165 (2003).
30. Id. at 161.
31. Id. at 162. For an example of passing as White by South Asians in Britain, see
Shompa Lahiri, Performing Identity: Colonial Migrants, Passing, and Mimicry Between the Wars,
10 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES, 408,411-413 (2003). Prominent actors Dean Cain and Keanu
Reeves have Asian Pacific American ancestry. Keanu Reeves-Biography, available at
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000206/bio; Dean Cain-Biography, available at
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001002/bio. However, they are generally perceived as
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Racial passing by individuals with Native American and Latino an-
cestry has had additional wrinkles. For Native Americans, centuries of
forced assimilation and intermarriage with Whites has resulted in many
mixed-race individuals with a White phenotype. 2 Like African American
families who have permanently passed into Whiteness, many such indi-
viduals no longer have any knowledge of their Native American ancestry.
They simply consider themselves, and may be considered by prevailing
social standards, as White.33 Such individuals arguably are not engaged in
any deliberate "deception" about their racial identity.34 In fact, even dur-
ing colonial times, some states considered such mixed-race individuals to
be legally White if the blood quantum of American-Indian ancestry was
sufficiently small.35
For individuals of Latino, and in particular Mexican, ancestry, lineage
has always been multi-racial by definition. As descendants of Latin Ameri-
can indigenous people and Spanish colonizers, attempts at passing as
White were often facilitated by innate physical characteristics. It may have
been as simple as denying one's indigenous ancestry and holding oneself
out as Spanish.36
Racial line crossing has not only occurred in the direction of
Whiteness. With respect to Asian Americans, for example, the on-screen
White. See, e.g., Liz Goodman, Inaction Hero: Surviving Keanu Reeves, Nov. 1, 2000, available
at http://modelminority.com/printout737.htm.
32. See, e.g., SPOTLIGHT ON HETEROGENEITY: THE FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR RACIAL
AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATION-SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 30 (Barry Edmonston et al. eds.,
1996) ("Among Indians enumerated in the 1910 census, only slightly more than one-half
(56 percent) reported full-blood ancestry.") (quoting C. MATTHEW SNIPP, AMERICAN INDI-
ANS: THE FIRST OF THIS LAND 167 (1989)). See also Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the
Future of Races, in STEVEN GREGORY & ROGER SANJEK, RACE 103, 106 (1994). See generally
CIRCE STURm, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION
OF OKLAHOMA (2002).
33. On the flip-side, there have been doubts expressed about the bonafide nature of
Native American racial identity of individuals whose phenotype is White, regardless of
their ancestry. See, e.g., Delphine Red Shirt, These are not Indians, 26 AM. INDIAN Q. 643;
John J. Miller, Honest Injun? The Incidence of Fake Indians is Almost Epidemic, THE NAT'L. REV.
Mar. 28, 2005, at 34; see also, Kathryn Rand & Steven Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA
Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y. &
L. 381 (1997).
34. Even though passing has been described as "a deception," suggesting some active
effort at misrepresentation, the most common view of the term, and the view I adopt here,
includes instances in which one individual fails to correct others' misperception of his or
her racial identity. However, it is quite different from somebody who is "merely mistaken
about his or her racial identity-for example, the man who, having been told all his life
that he is White, thinks of himself as White, and holds himself out to be White, though he
and everyone else in the locale would change that identification to "black" were the facts
of his ancestry known." KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 283-284.
35. MORAN, supra note 25, at 48-49.
36. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire:?" Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1997).
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roles of actors Lou Diamond Philips and Tommy Chong have led them to
be commonly perceived as Latino.37 Tiger Woods is predominantly and
primarily perceived as African American, even though his mother is
Thai.3 During World War I, some Japanese Americans claimed to be
Chinese in order to avoid war-time internment. In Louisiana, individuals
with both African American and American Indian ancestry frequently
choose to assert their Native American identity rather than their African
American identity.
39
There have been some well-known instances of White individuals
40passing as Native Americans. Passing as African American, however, has
generally been rare.41 Some instances when Whites did attempt to do so
have been described by Rachel Moran; it usually occurred when interra-
cial couples sought advantage or to avoid embarrassment. 42 An unusual,
but well-known instance involved John Howard Griffin. Seeking to ex-
plore the experience of being Black in America, Griffin, a White
journalist, chemically darkened his skin to journey through the South in
1959 .4
37. See, e.g., Peter Skerry, E Pluribus Hispanic?, WILSON Q., Summer (1992), available
at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=wqessay&essay-id=16545.
38. Jay Nordlinger, Hunting Tiger: Everybody Wants a Piece of Him, THE NAT'L. REV.
Sept. 16, 2000, at 38.
39. VIRGINIA P. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION 204 (1986) (pointing to the
example of the Houma tribe).
40. Miller, supra note 33 (discussing the example of Iron Eyes Cody who passed as a
Native American in the 1970's). See also discussion infra on ethnic/racial fraud; ALAN
TRACHTENBERG, SHADES OF HIAWATHA: STAGING INDIANS, MAKING AMERICANS 1880-1930
(2005).
41. In contrast, examples of impersonations of African Americans and other people
of color in the theatrical or black-face minstrel show context, and other similar theatrical
portrayals of other racial groups, are legion See, e.g., GINSBERG, supra note 17; GUBAR, supra
note 17;JOSEPHINE LEE, PERFORMING ASIAN AMERICA (1997).
42. MORAN, supra note 25, at 46. See also Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646
N.E.2d 150, 151 (1995); Luther Wright, Jr., Who' Black, aho's White, and Who Cares:
Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classification, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 513 (1995) (discussing the example of"soulmanning").
43. JOHN HowARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1960). See also Joshua Solomon, Skin
Deep; Reliving "Black Like Me": My Own Journey into the Heart of Race-Conscious America,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1994, excerpted in JuAN E PERA Er AL., RACE AND RACE: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 461-464 (2000); WALD, supra note 15, at 57 (Jazz
musician Milton "Mezz" Mezzrow, born Milton Mesirow to a Jewish family). But cf
LANGSTON HUGHES, Who is Passing for Who, in LAUGHING TO KEEP FROM CRYING (1952).
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2. Legal Recognition ofWhitness
(and other Racial Identities)"
A less obvious effort in crossing racial lines has had little equivalent
to passing in other contexts: seeking legal recognition of a different racial
identity, primarily Whiteness. Until 1954, federal naturalization statutes
restricted U.S. citizenship to free White persons. Before the Supreme
Court authoritatively held in 1922 and 192346 that Asians were not
White, hundreds of Chinese and Japanese were able to persuade the fed-
eral courts that they were White, enabling them to become naturalized
U.S. citizens . In doing so, they crossed the color line within the eyes of
the law, even if their social status and standing within the community may
have remained unchanged.
Similar efforts are exemplified by lawsuits filed by slaves seeking ju-
dicial declarations that they were White. For example, in ante-bellum
Alabama, Abby Guy contested her status as a slave by asserting and litigat-
ing her Whiteness.49  At trial, her purported owner submitted
documentary evidence supporting her status as a slave, and hence Black.49
The judge found in her favor. The court's judgment not only set her free
but also determined as a judicial matter that she was White.0
Contemporary litigation-driven efforts to acquire a White racial
identity have become less significant with the end of legal segregation.
The continuing significance of racial identity in individual self-
conception and everyday social interactions have not made such efforts
irrelevant, however. Some contemporary cases have focused on govern-
ment practices of collecting and maintaining racial identity information.
In Louisiana, the acts of Naomi Drake, supervisor and deputy registrar of
the Louisiana Bureau ofVital Statistics, led to a series of cases beginning
in the 1950s and up until the 1980s that challenged racial identity desig-
nations on birth certificates. Most of the law suits were unsuccessful. 1
44. See generally HANEY-LoPEZ, supra note 19.
45. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
46. United States v.Thind, 261 U.S. 204,214-15 (1923).
47. EILEEN TAMutA, AMERICANIZATION, AccULTURATION, AND ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE
NiSSEi GENERATION IN HAWAII 76 (1994).
48. Daniel v. Guy et al., 19 Ark. 121 (1857).
49. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
50. See also Johnson v. Boon, 28 S.C.L. 268, 1 Speers 268 (S.C.App.L. 1843) (defen-
dants successfully asserted that they were White in order to avoid a tax assessment imposed
on free colored persons.) For an unsuccessful effort at changing racial identity by legal
recognition, see Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1956). See also
DOMINGUEZ, supra note 39, at 87-89.
51. See Doe v. State, 479 So.2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985). See generally DOMINGUEZ,
supra note 39, at 36-51.The Louisiana state legislature changed the law in 1983. Id. at 3.
Drake was arguably a fanatic about enforcing rules of hypo-descent and implementing
[VOL. 11:367
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One particularly well-publicized case involved Suzie Phipps. Phipps
found out late in life that she was classified as Black in her birth records;
all her life she had believed herself to be White.12 When the registrar re-
fused to change the racial designation on her birth certificate, she sued.
The courts acknowledged the arbitrariness of the racial designations. Un-
fortunately, they also found that such designations were "correct"
according to the standards of the times when they were made. Hence, the
registrar could not be legally required to change the designation.
Legal recognition of non-White identity has remained significant,
primarily in three contexts: race discrimination claims, affirmative action,
and federal programs for members of federally recognized Indian tribes.
In race discrimination cases, the plaintiff's membership in a legally pro-
tected class-usually a racial minority-is a threshold question for any
discrimination claim. In the tribal programs and affirmative action con-
text, racial identity is a pre-requisite for program eligibility.
4
B. New Ways of Passing and Changing One's Racial Identity:
Medical Technology and Bureaucratic Records
There are two modern trends that have increased the options avail-
able to those wishing to cross color and race lines: 1) advancements in
science and medical technology; and 2) the increasing use of what might
be called "paper" or virtual identities.
Since at least the 19' century, surgical alteration of appearance has
been part of the repertoire of racial and ethnic minorities who could not
pass solely based on their naturally given physical appearance. Designed to
alter ethnic facial characteristics, such surgery has grown in popularity in
recent decades. 5 According to Sander Gilman, rudimentary facial surgery
techniques were used to lessen the "ethnic" size and appearance of Jewish
and Irish noses.5 6 Rhinoplasty was also used by "coloured" individuals in
apartheid South Africa to facilitate passing as White." Among East Asians,
procedures to re-examine racial designations as White when surnames suggested Black
ancestry. She was openly defiant of direction by supervisors and court orders requiring
racial designation changes. She was not dismissed until 1965. Id. at 44-45.
52. Id. at 1-5.
53. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities, et al., 860 E Supp. 1262 (N.D.
Ohio 1994).
54. While eligibility for Native American programs is usually formulated in terms of
ancestral blood quantum prerequisites, such requirements have been interpreted as a sub-
stantive proxy for racial identity. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 511-16 (2000).
55. SANDER L. GILMAN, MAKING THE BODY BEAUTIFUL: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AEsTHETIc SURGERY 85-156 (1999).
56. Id. at 139-142. Gilman even points to pre-nineteenth century surgical reversal
("decircumcision") of circumcised Jews to facilitate passing.
57. Id. at 114-115.
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efforts to alter the body to conform more closely with Western (White)
ideals have focused primarily on the eyes. The most common surgery,
double eye-lid surgery, is designed to create a fold in the upper eye-lid,
thereby making them rounder and more Western.'8
Advancements in science and medical technology have significantly
expanded these options and allowed for more sophisticated efforts to dis-
guise the ethnic or racial phenotype. The most widely known example is
probably pop-singer Michael Jackson's repeated surgeries that have turned
him from a brown-skinned African American boy into a pale-skinned
individual with a thin-nosed, surgically sculpted face. 9 The most recent
medical advances hold even greater promise for successful physical trans-
formations. Recent reports of a partial face transplant6 ° and the prospect
of full face transplants1 suggest the prospect of complete erasure of the
most visible aspect of racial phenotypes.
Other advancements in biomedical research present the possibility
for physical changes that go even deeper. In the not-so-distant future,
gene therapy could enable the alteration of a person's DNA not only to
cure inherited diseases but also to change the make-up of a person's ge-
netic heritage. It would not only present radically new possibilities for
"passing," but also challenge biologically deterministic views of race by
erasing the genetic evidence of one's racial ancestry.62
For those individuals whose physical characteristics either match
their expected racial phenotype or who will simply be unable to afford
the medical technology necessary to accomplish the physical transforma-
tion, opportunities to cross racial lines will arise primarily through paper
identities or some other virtual representation. Jerry Kang has suggested
that cyberspace, and the necessity to use virtual identities in such contexts,
may offer people some opportunity to free themselves from the restraints
of race in the real world, even though there may be pitfalls.63 His descrip-
tion is also applicable to increased bureaucratization and reliance on
personal records in our society.
58. Id. at 98-111.
59. For a discussion of the politics of skin color and appearance in the African
American community, see KATHY RUSSELL, MIDGE WILSON& RONALD HALL, THE COLOR
COMPLEX:THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS (1992.)
60. Carole Bianchi, Woman in France Receives World's First Face Transplant, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2005, at A22.
61. Osborne Wiggins, et al., Ott the Ethics of Facial Transplantation Research, 4, AM. J.
OF BIoErHICS (Summer 2004). See also Eric F Trump & Karen Maschke, A Stranger in tile
Mirror: Should Doctors Transplant Faces?, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at F5; Rick Weiss, Face
Transplants Raise Hopes-And Some Fears, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at Al; Michael Mason,
A New Face:A Bold Surgeon, An Untried Surgery, N.Y TIMES,July 26,2005, at Fl.
62. See infra section Ill(A). However, such developments would not significantly
affect theories about the socially constructed nature of race.
63. Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1130 (2000).
[VOL. 1 1:367
Choice and Fraud
Because of increased complexity of interactions between individuals
and institutions, record-keeping has created extensive "paper-identities"
similar to the virtual identities described by Kang.64 A tremendous
amount of personal information is now kept by entities ranging from
government to medical to financial institutions. The records of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, hospitals, credit
rating agencies, banks, schools and universities contain not only a person's
vital statistics, but also consumption preferences, financial profile, and
health history. In short, one's whole life may be found in a virtual form.
In the recent past, the substantive content of the records, and hence
the paper identity, has become increasingly important because decisions
about credit, government benefits, and other important life advantages are
now primarily or even exclusively made on the basis of such records. For
example, in the consumer credit card approval process, the issuing bank
and the consumer virtually never meet in person; instead, most of the
process hinges on the individual's credit score which is assembled through
impersonal financial records.6' All that the lender knows of the consumer
is usually the paper identity-the records available to the institution or
submitted by the applicant.66 In the personnel offices of large institutions,
there may be little or no interaction between the individual handling bu-
reaucratic aspects of employment and the actual person. To the personnel
officer, the individual may be represented entirely by the personnel re-
cord, the paper identity.
For racial identification purposes, the identity assigned in such re-
cords will thus oftentimes be the only information available regarding the
racial background of the real person. If a paper record designates the indi-
vidual as, for example, Asian, to a personnel officer, credit card application
reviewer, or social security agency employee, that person is for all practi-
cable purposes Asian.
Most of these virtual/record identities co-exist in infrequent and in-
substantial contact with their real-world counterparts. Consequently, the
possibilities of passing as a person of an alternate race are almost bound-
67less. Unlike passing that depends on consistency of visible physical
64. See, e.g., Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Iden-
tification System, 8 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 37, 56-57 (2002).
65. Jennifer Barrett Ozols, Boon or Bust?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 2004, available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5750688/site/newsweek/ (on file with author).
66. The general growth of identity fraud is a side-effect. FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION-IDENTITY THEFT SuRvEY REPORT (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-363, IDENTITY
THEFT: PREVALENCE AND COST APPEAR TO BE GROWING (Mar. 2002).
67. This might be one explanation why the racial and ethnic mis-identifications of
the Malone brothers were not challenged for years. But see, Hernandez, supra note 2, at 13;
Peggy Hernandez, Wife Defends Ex-Firefighter, Asserts Everybody Knew How Brothers Were
Hired, BoSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1988, at 21; Steven Marantz and Peggy Hernandez, Defining
SPRING 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
markers with the phenotype of the asserted alternate race, passing via a
paper identity does not. No need for physical plausibility is required. Pass-
ing via a paper identity is thus open not only to mixed race individuals or
those to whom nature has endowed with particular physical features, but
to anybody.68
C. The Construction of Race and Racial Identity
The phenomenon of passing and other manifestations of racial line
crossing illustrate important aspects of the concept of race and racial iden-
tity. Most traditional and modern ways of passing do not "change" an
individual physically. Passing is still considered a deception about one's
racial identity.
Yet, passing changes one's racial identity for all practical purposes.
The individual is recognized and treated as a member of another race or
ethnicity. In that sense, the individual has "changed" his or her racial iden-
tity. With respect to successful efforts to persuade the courts to recognize
White identity (or any other racial identity, for that matter), that crossing
is legally complete. The individual has acquired a different racial identity.
Passing and other manifestations of racial line crossing illustrate the
69
modern understanding of racial identity as a social and legal construct.
According to Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, race is the
product of human perception and classification . . 'Both what
constitutes a race and how one recognizes a racial difference
are culturally determined: . . . We decide that certain physical
characteristics-usually skin color, but perhaps also hair type,
stature, or other bodily features-will be primary markers of
group boundaries. We invent categories of persons marked by
those characteristics. The categories become socially significant
Race a Sensitive, Elusive Task; Boston's Hiring Probe Brings System Under Fire, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 23, 1988, at 33.
68. The possibility of using virtual/paper identities to deceive a discriminatory
system about the very basis of discrimination is not new. One historical antecedent was
the practice of creating "paper sons" during the Chinese exclusion period. Kitty Calavita,
The Paradoxes of Race, Class Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Act, 1872-
1910, 25 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2000); see generally RONALD TAKAKi, A HISTORY or
ASIAN AMERICANS: STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 234-237 (updated & rev. ed., 1'
Black Bay ed. 1998).
69. Michael Omi & Howard Wynant, RACIAL FORtATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 196oS TO THE 199OS (1994); Stephen Cornell & Douglas Hartmann, ETHNICITY
AND RACE: MAKING IDENTITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD (1998); EDMONSTON ET AL., supra
note 32, at 18-19; lan F Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HAsv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994); American Anthropo-
logical Association Statement on "Race," (May 17, 1998), available at htrp://www.
aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm (on file with author).
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to the extent that we use them to organize and interpret ex-
perience, to form social relations, and to organize individual
and collective action. In other words, the categories become
important only when we decide they have particular meanings
and act on those meanings.The characteristics that are the basis
of the categories, however, have no inherent significance. We
give them meaning, and in the process we create races."v
Accordingly, White, Black, American Indian, Asian, and Latino races
are not natural categories, but rather constructed identity groups.71 The
"racialization" process used "certain bodily features or assumed biological
characteristics... to mark [them] for differential status or treatment.-7 2 For
Blacks, American Indian, Asian, and Latinos, the rationale and process
were relatively obvious. Used among other things to justify economic
exploitation of human labor and claims to natural resources and land,
these racial classifications created persons who were relegated to lower
social class status and invested with fewer legal rights, including relegation
to chattel status during times of slavery. In contrast, the White racial cate-
gory was established in opposition to the non-White racial categories.
Like the other racial categories, certain people were assigned to it and
provided with distinct status and legal rights 3
The social construction of racial categories is most visible in the cri-
teria used to define them.While biological characteristics may have been
the asserted basis of the typology, cultural factors, behavior, and other ar-
bitrary criteria, such as "common knowledge," were usually equally or
more important.
7 4
70. CORNELL & HARTMANN, supra note 69, at 23-24 (quoting geneticist James King).
71. While the U.S. Census and others consider Latino, as a synonym for Hispanic, to
be an ethnic category only, among the public it is quite frequently thought of as a racial
category. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE 1997 STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNIcITY at 16-17,
26-27, 70 (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
statpolicy.html#dr. In fact, during cognitive field testing of the 2000 Census question on
race and ethnicity, it became apparent that many Hispanic or Latino respondents thought
of themselves as a separate racial category. Id. at 27. See also EDMONSTON ET AL., supra note
32, at 24, 29 (during 1990 Census, many "Hispanics checked the 'Other' category for race
and then did not respond to the Hispanic-origin question"); Rachel L Swarns, Census Plan
Perplexes Hispanics, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 2004, at A13; Luis Angel Toro, "A
People Distinct from Others": Race and identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classifi-
cation in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1219 (1995); HANEY-LoPEZ, The
Social Construction of Race, supra note 69, at 27-34 (describing the racialization of Mexi-
cans).
72. HANEY-LOPEZ, The Social Construction of Race, supra note 69, at 33.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., DOMINGUEZ, supra note 39, at 205-261; HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 19;
Gross, supra note 49.
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Popular and scholarly understanding of race has not always ac-
knowledged the socially constructed nature of race. For much of the 19 h
century, race was widely accepted as a valid scientific concept.15 Yet, there
• - 76
was little scientific consistency in its use or description. As a tribute to
the arbitrariness of racial classifications during those times, legislators even
on occasion spoke of ra'es in the same way as nationalities, distinguishing
for example between the Irish, German, Italian, and Greek races.7
Even if some biologically deterministic views of race persist to this
day,78 science has largely shown that any significant biological differences
between racial groupings are illusory.9 Most importantly, science has
shown that inter-racial variations are dwarfed by intra-racial variations in
physical characteristics and biological distinctions.80
Racial passing, racial identity, and the ability for some to cross racial
lines are artifacts distinctly associated with the socially constructed nature
of race. Their content and meaning arise out of and are bounded by the
social and legal descriptions of race.
II. CHOICE OF IDENTITY AND RACIAL FRAUD
Given the history of passing and other acts of crossing the race and
color lines, what does one make of contemporary instances of related ef-
forts, such as by the Malone brothers, Ward Churchill, and university
applicants who are engaged in box-checking? These acts are commonly
evaluated through two different lenses. On one hand, they may be seen as
instances of individuals exercising personal choices about their concep-
tions of self. This perspective is best embodied in the federal government's
75. For a history of the origination of the use of the race concept in race as a form
of descent and lineage as well as race as a typology of differences between human groups,
see MICHAEL BANTON, RACIAL THEORIES 1-64 (1987). See generally JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR.,
THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM
(2001).
76. CORNELL & HARTMANN, supra note 69, at 21.
77. See, e.g., Saint Francis College v. A] Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611-13 (1987) (dis-
cussing post-Civil War congressional debates that referred to various ethnic groups as
separate races, including Scandinavians, Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Jews, Latinos, Mexicans,
Spaniards, Chinese, Mongolians, and Gypsies); EDMONSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
78. See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994); MICHAEL LEVIN, WHY RACE
MATTERS: RACE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT THEw MEAN (1992). Both publications were
funded in part by the Pioneer Fund. "The purpose of the Pioneer Fund was to demon-
strate the genetic inferiority of blacks." GRAVES, supra note 75, at 154.
79. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. GOULD,THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
80. See, e.g., R.C. LEWONTIN, STEVEN ROSE, & LEON J. KAMIN, NOT IN OUR GENES:
BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE 126-127 (1984). See also L.L. Cavali-Sforza, The
Genetics of Human Populations, 231 ScI. AM. 80 (Sept. 1974); R.C. Lewontin, The Appor-
tionment of Human Diversity, 6 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 381, 397 (1972).
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approach to race in the decennial census. Alternatively, they may also be
viewed as efforts of deception. Recent assertions of fraud in racial and
ethnic self-identification for affirmative action programs represent this
other perspective.
A. Choice of Identity
In the census, the federal government's official and principal position
with respect to racial classification is self-definition.8 ' Accordingly, ques-
tion 6 of the Census, "What is your race," asks each individual "to indicate
what this person considers himself/herself to be.,82 The question requests
the self-considered, personal views of racial identity of the respondent.
The response is arguably conclusive and not subject to second-guessing
83by contrary views or perceptions of third parties.
1. Why Choice?
The Census adopts a system of self-identification as opposed to clas-
sification by some set of "objective" criteria, or by a disinterested third-
party. Its position reflects the view that race is a social and political con-
struct rather than a fixed attribute dependent only on physical,
phenotypic appearance (or genetic make-up, for that matter) .84 Arguably,
the most important reason for doing so is the history of government-
sponsored classification. The racial caste systems of segregation and slavery
were vitally dependent on government sponsorship of rigid racial classifi-
cation criteria. Explicit choice of a self-recognition approach as the
primary and conclusive method openly rejects the past. The Census posi-
tion also supports the strong popular sentiment that racial identity is a
matter of individual autonomy and self-determination.85
Self-identification is usually also most accurate. Racial identity is not
only a function of physical characteristics and appearances, but also of an
individual's social interactions and relationships. The full spectrum of
81. Self-identification dates back to the 1960s. See Ss ERRY, COUNTING ON THE CEN-
sus? 46 (2000) (citing MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMEmCAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY
201-202 (1988)).
82. Bureau of the Census, United States Census 2000, Form D-2, Question 6.
83. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROvISIONAL GUIDANCE supra note 71, at
10. But see discussion infra.
84. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDS FOR THE
CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, 62 FR. 58782, 58788 (Oct.
30, 1997).
85. See, e.g., Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Catego-
ries, African Americans and the US. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Ford, supra note
21; KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 334-335.
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social perceptions and interactions with others is known most completely
only to the census respondent him or herself.
8 6
Finally, the most powerful reason for self-identification is the com-
mon wisdom that our society now lives in, or at least is striving to create,
a color-blind society. In a color-blind society, racial designation is relevant
only as a vital statistic, like hair or eye color, and ought not have any social
or legal significance. As a corollary, an individual's choice of racial identity
presumably would have no social or legal significance either. Governmen-
tal regulation would not only be unnecessary but also non-sensical-just
like the regulation of ice cream flavor preference.
2. The Limits of Choice
Sole reliance on a system of self-identification encounters problems,
however. It leaves unaddressed concerns about manipulation, administra-
tive workability, and fairness. After all, a color-blind society still remains
(and may forever be) more a great-sounding slogan than an existing real-
ity. Race is still a salient personal characteristic in social interactions. It
continues to be relevant in legal contexts such as anti-discrimination laws
and affirmative action programs.
How can one "check" opportunistic manipulation of the system, as
in the case of the Malone brothers? If classification is solely a function of
an individual's choice with no constraints and criteria ensuring consis-
tency, how can the designation be useful for any systematic regulatory
use? Is it possible to maintain public confidence and support for govern-
mental programs that rely on such classifications if there is no assurance
that such programs are being fairly and effectively applied?
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Malone v.
Haley suggested at least one limit to self-identification: sincerity. Just as
religious beliefs must be sincere for Free Exercise Clause purposes, the
same requirement could be applied to racial identification. 7 This require-
ment would probably allow the screening of a variety of opportunistic
claims, like those of the Malone brothers.
Is such a criterion enough, however? What if the only evidence sup-
porting racial identity claims points to a sincere belief and acts of
expressive affiliation,8 but unaccompanied by community recognition,
consistent physical appearance, and documentary evidence? For example,
take a White individual who sincerely enjoys Black culture and would like
to be part of that community. Or maybe somebody who sincerely admires
American Indian culture and spiritual beliefs, perhaps especially their en-
86. EDMONSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 17.
87. See, e.g., TserningYang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurispru-
dence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 172 (1997).
88. See infra Part III(B).
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vironmental tenets, and seeks to practice them on his own. Given the lim-
ited resources of virtually all affirmative action programs, is it appropriate
to allow an individual with such minimal claims to displace another per-
son who can marshal support via official records, community recognition,
and physical appearance? Unquestioned acceptance of sincere self-
identification seems questionable as a fair selection criterion unless the
inquiry is to become meaningless as a practical decision-making tool.
In practical reality and by instinct, of course, most people's racial
identity judgments are not based only on sincere self-identification. They
also look to considerations such as ancestry, documentary evidence or
community recognition. Hence, minimalist claims arguably should not
pose a real threat because they are so uncommon. According to Randall
Kennedy, even if they did pose a threat, society ought to tolerate some
amount of racial fraud as a price of permitting individuals freely to de-
termine for themselves their racial identity.89
But what about the corollary question that the Census approach
raises but leaves unanswered: If racial identity is truly a matter of individ-
ual and personal choice, should people be made aware of such a choice,
and should we encourage the exercise of such choice openly? Existing
attitudes suggest the opposite. Free choice appears to contradict some
governmental policy, most social expectations, and the "practical reality"
of choice.
3.The Reality of Choice
The "practical reality" of choice must be evaluated by reference to
its social and legal context. Assumed away by the Census' personal choice
approach is this question: is it appropriate to conceptualize racial identity
as primarily within the control of the particular individual? What about
external constraints on racial identity choice?
As a socially, politically, and legally constructed concept, popular
views about race are not sui generis. Just as individual identity generally is
shaped indelibly by the community, perceptions and choices about racial
identity are shaped by social conventions and expectations, historical uses,
and applicable legal norms.90 In other words, self-perception and choices
of racial identity are not only the result of what individuals believe or may
want to believe about themselves as an ideal, but also what others think or
have thought, however unreasonable or false. How we conceive ourselves
is necessarily affected by others, including their racial perceptions,
89. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 337.
90. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 222 (1993) ("bonds of society and
culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are nor-
mally so strong that the right of emigration ... does not suffice to make accepting its
authority free [of coercion]").
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stereotypes and prejudices.' If others perceive me as Asian American, is
there not a delusional quality to my choice to be White, Black, or any
other race? If nobody else accepts my choice or treats me any different
based on it, is my choice at all meaningful?
92
Perceptions about racial identity also do not exist in a historical vac-
uum. Beliefs and assumptions expressed in public discourse about racial
identity remain generally consistent with traditional racial classification
schemas, including the one-drop rule. Inertia of perception, as well as the
private persistence of the racial caste system and White privilege, mean
that racial identity categories are changing only slowly.93 The one-drop
rule may have been discredited as a legal determinant of African Ameri-
can identity. Nevertheless, it continues to be widely used and relied upon,
even by many within the African American community, as a means of
determining identity and belonging to the community.94
High-profile cases like Malone v. Haley also shape popular percep-
tions about racial identity. The fact that racial mis-identification by the
Malone brothers was treated as a fraud, investigated, and punished suggests
to popular perception that racial misrepresentation is both illegal and
punishable. Consistent with the earlier history of laws governing racial
classification in the United States, Malone v. Haley arguably confirms not
only the immutability of race, but also that attempts to cross racial lines
are punished with the force of law.
Finally, it is unclear how well known the Census position on racial
identity is. The Census forms do not make explicit that self-identification
is conclusive of racial status as opposed to being an information gathering
technique intended to promote administrative efficiency. For example,
nobody would believe that just because a government form instructs an
applicant to fill in a birth date, the individual can make up a date without
any relationship to one's actual date of birth and have it accepted by the
government as conclusively true. Virtually everybody would agree that
false information could at a minimum be corrected and might even lead
to criminal prosecution or a fraud charge.
Consistent with such perceptions, the Census engages in spot-
checking to determine the accuracy of the information provided on their
91. See e.g., Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, supra note 69, at 46-50;
Angela P Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 614
(1990); Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and Morality, 6 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 137 (1991).
92. See Hickman, supra note 85, at 1246-1247. See also infra Part Ill(B).
93. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROVIsIONAL GUIDANCE supra
note 71, at 7. Cf Id. at 69 (suggesting that children have a significandy higher rate of mul-
tiple race reports than adults).
94. An example is the racial identity of Tiger Woods as perceived by himself and by
the public.
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forms.9s It "corrects" responses that are inconsistent with information pro-
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vided elsewhere in the Census questionnaire. Checking answers for
"accuracy" would suggest to many that the Census expects people to use
objective criteria. In other words, racial self-identification decisions are
made in the shadow of what most people perceive to be legally binding
classification criteria, however ambiguous the criteria may be.97 Uniform-
ity in racial classification may thus be attributable to misunderstanding
rather than consensus.
B. The Case of Racial Fraud
The alternative to making racial identification entirely subjective,
especially where abuse is a concern, is regulation of classification criteria.
Otherwise, limited resources for affirmative action may be misused or
squandered, anti-discrimination law implementation and enforcement
rendered ineffective, and our understanding of the continuing existence of
discrimination made inaccurate.
Application of traditional fraud doctrine, as applied by the adminis-
trative hearing examiner and the reviewing court in Malone v. Haley, is the
most recent judicial analysis of traditional fraud doctrine applied racial
identity claims. Given the paucity of such cases, the test set out in Malone
v. Haley would likely be the starting point for any inquiry, judicial or oth-
erwise, into racial fraud in other jurisdictions. The reasoning of Malone
continues to be used officially within Massachusetts.98
95. In 1993, the Census Bureau's Content Reinterview Survey (CRS) contacted
approximately 13,000 households who had returned the 1990 Census forms (With ap-
proximately 24,000 individuals) in order to determine how responses provided to Census
interviewers compared to responses given in the written Census form. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE 1990 CPH-E-1, CONTENT REiNTERvIEw SuRvEY: Ac-
CURACY OF DATA FOR SELECTED POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS AS MEASURED
BY REINTERViEW (Sept. 1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph-
e/cph-e-l.pdf.
96. For example, individuals who selected the "Some Other Race" category on the
2000 Census, including many who wrote in "Latino," were re-assigned a racial identity
based on other information provided on the questionnaire. Swarns, supra note 71.
97. See discussion supra, Part I(A)(1), and infra, Part Ill(C). See also SKERER, supra note
81, at 54-56 (detailing examples of popular misunderstandings about conclusive self-
identification on the Census).
98. See Glossary of Civil Service Terms (setting out Malone v. Haley definition of
"black"), available at http://www.mass.gov/portal/index.jsp?pagelD=hrdterminal&L =
3&LO=Home&L1 =Civil+ Service&L2=Guides+%26+Publications&sid=Ehrd&b=terin
alcontent&f=cs.glossary-cs__glossary&csid=Ehrd (on file with author).
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1. A Modern Application of Racial Fraud: Malone v. Haley
The review of the Malone brothers' racial identification was trig-
gered by a fraud provision in the Massachusetts Civil Service System
regulations, Personnel Administration Rule 3(4)(c). The provision stated
that:
The administrator may ... declare a candidate's appointment
invalid upon proof of any of the following conditions after a
hearing held by the administrator.
(c) The knowingly making of a material false statement by any
person in his application .... or the commission of or attempt
to commit any fraud against civil service law or rules .... 99
In early 1988, Boston Fire Commissioner Leo Stapleton noticed
that the Malone brothers were listed as Black on a promotion list sent to
his office. He knew them because they were the only set of identical
twins, and he understood that they were White.'00 After an investigation
by the Department of Personnel Administration and an administrative
hearing, they were fired for "willfully and falsely" claiming that they were
Black "'for the sole purpose of obtaining the minority preference' under
a 1975 federal court decree."' 0' They "thus had their jobs illegally."' 02
At the administrative hearing, the Malones were given the opportu-
nity to rebut their allegedly false race designation either by 1) showing
that they had "acted in good faith," or 2) demonstrating that they were in
fact "Black".' 3 The criteria that the hearing officer applied, and which
had been used by the Massachusetts Personnel Administration since
1984, '04 were: "(i) visual observation of physical features; (ii) documentary
evidence establishing black ancestry, such as birth certificates; and (iii) evi-
dence that the Malones or their families held themselves out to be black
and are considered black in the community."' 5
99. Massachusetts Personnel Administration Rule 4(3)(c), Office of Legal Counsel,
Human Resources Division Feb. 28, 2003, available at http://www.mass.gov/Ehrd/docs/
cs/publications/personneladministratorrulesforonline.doc.
100. Peggy Hernandez and John Ellement, Two Fight over Disputed Claim They are
Black, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1988, at 29.
101. NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F2d 1017, C.A. No. 72-3060-F (C.A. 1974) (cited in
Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339 at 2).
102. Id.; Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E.2d at 151; Malone v. Haley, No.
88-339 at 3.
103. See Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E.2d at 147.
104. Peggy Hernandez, No Minority Job Screens Done Before '84 City Says, BOSTON
GLOBE,Jan. 18, 1989, at 19; Marantz & Hernandez, supra note 67, at 33.
105. Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E.2d at 151; Malone v. Haley, No 88-
339 at 17. (When asked why he thought someone might question his claim of minority
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After a 2-day hearing, the hearing officer Hilda I. Lopez-Soto con-
cluded that the Malones had failed conspicuously to establish any of the
three factors. She stated, "I visually observed the Malone brothers at the
hearing. They each appear to me to have fair skin and fair hair coloring,
to have Caucasian facial features. Based on my visual observation, they do
not appear to be black"
10 6
Their defense also failed on the documentary evidence. Birth cer-
tificates "established the White racial identity of the Malones for three
generations " '0 The purported photograph of their great grandmother
Sarah, who was alleged to be Black and thus supportive of their claims,
was found to be inconclusive and questionable.'08 The "hearing officer and
the personnel administrator simply did not credit the Malones story that,
after having failed to gain appointment in 1974 as non-minority candi-
dates, they discovered the existence of a Black ancestor in 19 7 6 " ' 0°9
Moreover, "there was no reliable means of verifying the identity of
the woman in the photograph" as their ancestor, other than their hearsay
testimony." The "photograph itself was inconclusive on the issue of the
race of the woman pictured."" '1 Finally, the hearing officer found that the
Malones had neither "identified themselves personally or socially as
Blacks" nor that they "conducted themselves in the community as
Blacks."-
1 2
The hearing officer determined that the Malones had acted in bad
faith and without a reasonable basis. They made no effort to confirm their
claim of Black ancestry, nor did they attempt to "clarify the standards for
asserting minority status." 113 On the day of his appointment as a firefighter,
Philip Malone was given a Personnel Survey form that "asked for an ex-
planation of the source of his claim of minority status."" 4 He "left that
part of the form blank," explaining to the hearing officer that he did not
think the question pertained to him and that it was not important at the
time."0 Paul Malone answered the same question by stating that his father
was Black. 6 In short, their conduct suggested that they made significant
status Philip Malone also stated "... . well, very light skin fellow. Somebody might question
and say 'he doesn't look Black' whatever.")
106. Hernandez & Ellement, supra note 100, at 29. See also Malone v. Haley, No. 88-
339 at 17.
107. Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E.2d at 152 n.5.
108. Id.
109. Malone v. Haley, No. 33-889 at 19.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 19-20.
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 22.
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efforts to avoid any challenge or inquiry into the factual basis of their ra-
cial identity claims.
The Malone brothers lost on both their objective claim of being
Black and the sincerity of their belief. The administrative findings and
terminations were upheld by Justice Herbert Wilkins of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court as supported by substantial evidence."17 The deci-
sion to fire them relied on two key elements of the fraudulent
misrepresentation doctrine specifically articulated within the Personnel
Administration rule: objective falsity and intention to deceive.18 Even if
the Malones had not intentionally falsified the "suddenly discovered"
photograph of their Black maternal great grandmother, most people
would interpret the factual circumstances of the discovery, and their sub-
sequent assertion of being Black, as having been made recklessly and
without any good faith belief in the well-foundedness of that connection.
Either way, the Malones would not have prevailed under applicable doc-
trine.' 9
With respect to objective falsity, the hearing officer combined quasi-
objective criteria, like documentary evidence and in-court factual deter-
minations by visual observation (presumably through the use of physical
racial identity markers), with subjective ones of public self-identification
and community acceptance. Other than the "suddenly discovered," but
inconclusive photograph of their maternal grandmother, the Malones
provided virtually no other supporting evidence.
2. The Limits of Fraud Doctrine
The Malone brothers' actions were plainly unpalatable, and the case
outcome makes intuitive sense. But the application of fraud doctrine to
test racial identity raises significant questions. Below, I evaluate the two
elements examined in Malone v. Haley, objective falsity and good faith, as
well as a third, materiality of the misrepresentations.'
20
a. Objective Falsity
The hearing officer found that the Malone brothers were not "ob-
jectively" Black under three criteria: 1) visual appearance, 2) documentary
evidence, and 3) community perception. 2' The only substantial evidence
117. Id. at 23.
118. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1345 & n. 1 (2000); REST. (2D) TORTS § 525
(1976).
119. See, e.g., Gross v. Sussex Inc., 332 Md. 247, 630 A.2d 1156 (1993). See also
DOBBS, supra note 118, at 1347.
120. REST. (2D) TORTS § 538 (1976); DOBBS, supra note 118, at 1363-1364.
121. Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E. 2d at 152 n.5.
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introduced was the photo of the Malone brothers' supposed Black mater-
nal great grandmother, but the hearing officer discounted the picture.122
If one takes the Malone test seriously, a different conclusion should
have resulted if a birth certificate for their grandmother had been found
indicating her race as Black or African American. The twins would have
had 1/8 Black ancestry, little different from Homer Plessy and many other
light-skinned African Americans. Given popular notions about racial
identity and the persistence of hypo-descent, most people would have
considered the brothers Black.123
But should that have been enough? Neither they nor their family
had ever held themselves out as anything but White. They were recog-
nized by their community, co-workers, and employer as White. And they
had no cultural or social connections to the Black community. Other than
within their fire department employment records, they had always been
White.
The contradictory considerations in determining the Malones' racial
identity are an inherent consequence of the conflicted nature of race as a
social and legal construct. Unlike fixed or absolute criteria used to charac-
terize or define physical objects, race has ill or no defined boundaries. For
example, because slavery depended on the maintenance of the color line,
racial mixing and the associated blurring of racial categories required
continual re-definition of who was considered legally Black and thus en-
slavable.' 24 Around the beginning of the 20h century these developments
culminated in the rules of hypo-descent. In contrast, Virginia created the
so-called "Pocahontas exception" which accorded individuals who had
only minimal American Indian ancestry status as White. It was said to
have been specifically designed for the descendants of Pocahontas and
Englishman John Rolfe and other prominent citizens ofVirginia.1
25
Even the definition of Whiteness changed over time. Until the early
20 h century, it was presumed that being White meant having "White" or
fair skin color. In the context of the U.S. naturalization statute, which
provided that only free White persons could become U.S. citizens, White
became equivalent to Caucasian ancestry126 and finally designated only
122. Malone v. Haley, No. 33-889 at 19.
123. If truthful, their discovery would have shared bits of the lives of Suzie Phipps
and Anatole Broyard. Like Suzie Phipps, "discovery" of their Black ancestry came only
later in life. Like Anatole Broyard, they presumably sought to avoid losing the privileges of
being White by passing.
124. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1989).
125. MORAN, supra note 25, at 49-50.
126. Ozawa, 260 U.S. 178.
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individuals who were known by common knowledge to be White.'2 7
What such "common knowledge" meant was left entirely undefined.'
28
Modern equal protection jurisprudence has largely ended the use of
the legal definitions of old. Nevertheless, concepts such as hypo-descent
persist in popular views of race. Without a consensus about the specific
content, both meaning and boundaries, of racial categories, assertions
about racial identity are impossible to evaluate in a rational fashion.29 As a
result, it is nonsensical to seek an objectively truthful determination of
racial identity in much the same way that one ordinarily looks for truth
or falsity in a fraud inquiry 30 Like statements of opinion, judgment, or
belief, racial identifications cannot be objectively determined true or false
for purposes of fraud.'3'
The hearing examiner did discount the photograph of the Malones'
purported Black ancestor, the single piece of substantial evidence intro-
duced by the Malones. But even if the existence of a Black ancestor had
been confirmed, that should not have been the end of the inquiry into
whether they were Black for purposes of the affirmative action hiring
program. Racial identity is not a question that can be answered by ances-
tral "facts" alone. 32 The Malone brothers' Black identity was questionable
not only because of the lack of specific and conclusive evidence of ances-
try, i.e. because their racial identification was factually incorrect, and thus
they had made a "false statement;" rather, it is because as a matter of social
or legal judgments they were not deemed to be Black.
b. Sincerity or Good Faith Belief
The hearing examiner also "concluded that the Malones had wil-
fully and falsely identified themselves as Black in order to receive
appointments to the department.' ' 3  They had "claimed minority status in
bad faith."'' 34 Since they and their families had always held themselves out
127. Thind, 261 U.S. 204.
128. HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 19.
129. Some communities and groups, such as anthropologists, scientists, or even White
supremacists, may have their own internal definitions. However, none of these definitions
can be described as universal or generally accepted even in the loosest sense of the term.
130. There are parallels to an individual's sincerely held religious beliefs. Neither
racial identity nor religious belief can be objectively "wrong." For religious beliefs, that
may be attributable to their inherently subjective, metaphysical context.
131. REST. (2D) TORTs, § 525, cmt. d.
132. The same question is posed more subtly when it is asked whether an individual
is "Black" enough to qualify as African American for affirmative action hiring. See, e.g.,
Leonard M. Baynes, Who is Black Enough forYou? An Analysis of Northwestern University Law
School's Struggle over Minority Faculty Hiring, 2 MICH.J. RACE & L. 205 (1997).
133. Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E. 2d at 151.
134. Id. at 152.
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as White and were recognized as such by the community, their claim sim-
ply seemed non-credible and opportunistic.
The unspoken premise of the finding is that one's public racial iden-
tity, that ascribed by and held out to the community, is always consistent
with one's self-identified race. But as racial passing demonstrates, individu-
als sometimes go to great lengths to conceal their "true" race. Anatole
Broyard, for example, concealed his racial heritage even to his own chil-
dren until his death. 5  For some families, such concealment may be so
complete that Black ancestry is forgotten or hidden for generations.
It seems plausible that the Malone brothers might not have known
about their Black ancestor until their adulthood. If the very reason for
concealment is to avoid prevailing prejudice and discrimination, there
would be no reason to disclose one's Black racial identity if it would only
lead to disadvantage. 136 That changed when the Malones applied for jobs
at the Boston Fire Department.
However, there is a further reason why one might consider the
brothers' claims to have been made in bad faith. If the Malones had
claimed to be Black only for the purpose of obtaining the fire department
jobs, their claim was arguably a pretext rather than a genuine expression
of their racial identity. They neither changed their social or cultural asso-
ciations, nor publicized their new-found racial identity to the Black
community or anyone else.1
3
1
Again, doing so may not necessarily be inconsistent with claiming to
be Black. Apart from simply passing as White, the Malones could have
continued to view themselves as White in spite of having a Black ancestor.
That was the very claim that fair-skinned Susie Phipps made when she
sued the state of Louisiana to be declared White. Phipps had always be-
lieved that she was White until she applied for a passport. Then she found
out that her birth certificate designated her as Black because she had 1/32
135. GATES, supra note 28, at 180-214.
136. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See:" Mhite Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Stephanie Wild-
man & Adrienne Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How
INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7, 11-20 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1996). See generally PERM, supra note 43, at 455-464.
137. Bella English, Color Coordinated, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 1988, at 21; Peggy
Hernandez, Wife Defends Ex-Firefighter, Asserts 'Everybody Knew' How Brothers Were Hired,
supra note 67, at 21.The Malone brothers did present evidence at the administrative hear-
ing that "various co-workers were aware that they had claimed to be Black on the 1977
[civil service] examination or that they were listed in Fire Department records as Black,
[But] there was no testimony that the Malones in any way conducted themselves in the
community as Blacks." Malone v. Haley, No. 33-889 at 19-20 (emphasis added).
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Black ancestry. Susie Phipps continued to identify and view herself as
White. Louisiana law, of course, did not agree.1
9
Massachusetts has had no blood quantum definition of race. Given
the persistence of hypo-descent views, 1 40 it does not seem unreasonable
for the Malones to have believed that 1/8 Black ancestry could justify a
claim of Black racial identity for legal purposes, including employment,
even if the claimants viewed themselves to be White. Put differently, if
racial identity is a legal or social conclusion, as I have suggested above,
why could one not believe, genuinely, that one is Black for legal purposes,
but White for social and community purposes? If one has a remote Black
ancestor, conflicting views about rules of hypo-descent and racial self-
identification would seem to support either conclusion.
Maybe an individual should not be entitled to the benefits of being
Black unless they have also been subject to the detriments of that status-
what Adrian Piper has called the "Suffering test.' 41 Yet, that type of re-
quirement would seem to judge those who pass rather harshly. More
importantly, it misjudges their state of mind. While they may not desire
the burdens of being Black, they do not really believe that they are White.
They are well aware of their act of deception and that society would
likely view them as Black if all relevant facts of their background and an-
cestry were known to the community. 142
As a biological matter, there is little question that virtually every in-
dividual is the result of some intermixing of human populations from
various continents-the question is only whether it occurred in the near
past or hundreds or thousands of years ago.' 43 If racial ancestral claims are
sincere, even if temporally distant, society's conflicted views about race
make it arguably legally reasonable for just about anybody to assert that
138. Doe v. State, 479 So.2d at 369. See generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 39, at 36-51;
Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSITION 4, 18 (1992).
139. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 39, at 36-51.
140. For example, until 1988, the National Center for Health Statistics essentially
applied hypo-descent notions to assign the racial identity of mixed-race children. "If the
parents were of different races and one parent was White, the child was assigned the race
of the parent who was not White." OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROVISIONAL
GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at 81. See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED MOTHERS: UNITED STATES 1980-1992, VITAL AND HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, at 53, series 21, no. 53 (1995), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_21/sr2l_053.pdf.
141. Piper, supra note 138, at 7.
142. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 283-86.
143. One look at European history over the past several millennia reveals a multitude
of trans-continental migrations, invasions, and empires that spanned Europe, Africa, and
Asia. See, e.g., Armand Marie Leroy, A Family Tree in Every Gene, N.Y TIMES, March 14,
2005, at A21. Archaeological discoveries also indicate the evolutionary descent of humans
from pre-historical individuals in Africa and elsewhere.
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they may be Black, Asian, etc.'14 Such claims enjoy plausibility because the
"rules" for determining racial identity have been confused, are themselves
extreme in their application, and still enjoy significant acceptance as a so-
cial method of determining racial identity.
145
In the Malone case, the evidence suggested that they were either ly-
ing about their personal beliefs or did not care whether they truly had
any Black ancestors. The Malone brothers themselves did not believe in
their Black identity. Anything short of such a factual finding, however,
would have been inadequate if one takes the conflicted nature and beliefs
about race seriously.
c. Materiality
The Malone case did not specifically address why racial identity was
material to their hiring. Since the twins' civil service exam scores were
not high enough to be hired if they had identified as White, it was not an
issue.146 However, the materiality element raises troubling questions when
viewed in a larger context, especially with respect to the more general
need to collect racial identity information for the implementation of af-
firmative action programs and other race remedial efforts. Desegregation
efforts at Lowell High School in San Francisco are one illustration.
Beginning in 1983, the San Francisco Unified School District be-
came the subject of a desegregation consent decree designed to increase
enrollment by Blacks and other racial minorities.The decree required that
each school be made up of no more than 45% of any one racial or ethnic
minority group (40% at some schools) and that no fewer than four of
nine defined ethnic/racial groups be represented. 147 Accurate racial iden-
tity information for each pupil was critical to ensure racial balance and
the fair application of the admissions criteria. Misrepresentation could
144. For an illustration of the mixed race ancestry of some prominent historical
European individuals and families, see generally http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/secret/famous/.
145. In one informal and light-hearted social conversation, some friends revealed to
me that they had designated their infant son as Hispanic at birth, thinking far ahead about
racial identification for affirmative action purposes. They had previously described their
own ethnic background as Scottish and Jewish. The justification for their son's Hispanic
designation was the Jewish father's ancestors who had migrated to Spain some time in the
early Middle Ages, but then had been expelled from there in the 15th Century.
146. When they had done so two years earlier, they had been turned down. Malone v.
Haley, No. 33-889 at 1-2.
147. San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F Supp. 34, 53
(N.D.Cal. 1983).The nine defined racial and ethnic groups were: 1) Spanish-surname; 2)
Other White; 3) Black; 4) Chinese; 5) Japanese; 6) Korean; 7) Filipino; 8) American Indian;
9)Other Non-White.
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make it impossible to implement or monitor compliance with the con-
sent decree.
14 8
Prior to 2001, the San Francisco Unified School District required
"all children ... new to the School District [or] wishing to transfer out of
their assigned school" to complete "Preregistration and Optional Enroll-
ment Request" forms. On these forms, "parent/guardians [had to] identify
the racial/ethnic composition of students. 1 49 The information sheet ac-
companying the form went on to state that the racial/ethnic
identification would become part of the permanent record of the student
and could be altered only once, if it was substantiated by appropriate
documentation and rationale.
A different portion of the information sheet warned that "[u]nder
both federal and state law, any falsification of information provided to the
District will constitute perjury, and will result in possible further legal ac-
tion and cancellation of any transaction that involved the enrollment of a
child." ° The form itself contained a section entitled "Racial/Ethnic Iden-
tification: CHECK ONLY ONE." The thirteen boxes of which only one
may be checked [were] as follows: "African American; American Indian;
Chinese; Filipino; Hispanic/Latino; Japanese; Korean; White; Arabic; Sa-
moan; Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.); Middle
Easterner (Turkey, Iran, etc.); Other Non-White."''
Applying concepts of racial fraud to police accurate racial data col-
lection is problematic, however. How would such information be
necessary, or material, when assignment to a specific school was irrelevant
to the child's (or parents') wishes, or if a child wanted to enter a non-
competitive school that was already racially balanced? In other words,
what if a non-beneficiary of affirmative action lies about his or her racial
identity? If the particular individual does not receive undeserved benefits,
no limited resources have been expended. The same would apply if a
Black person asserted that they were White.
One answer is that the school district would not know beforehand
which school the child might end up and whether that school could be-
come racially unbalanced in the future. And since the enrollment or
transfer process is a good point for student data collection, gathering racial
information at that time is efficient and makes sense.
On the other hand, school attendance is mandatory, and a child
must be allowed to enter the school district irrespective of his or her ra-
cial identity. Furthermore, a transfer decision would ordinarily be made
based on criteria presumably unrelated to a child's race unless the transfer
would upset racial balance at a school. Most of the time, racial identity
148. For a discussion of what the motivation for misrepresentation might be, see
discussion infra at Part II(B)(3).
149. Ho v. San Francisco Unified School District, 147 E3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1998).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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would not be material to the decision. Yet, misidentification would have
obvious adverse consequences for the quality of the data used to assess the
success of or ongoing necessity for district-wide desegregation efforts.
In fact, for any type of affirmative action program to be effective, ac-
curate racial identification is needed for both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. Any large-scale lying or deception would undermine the
program. But for racial fraud purposes, accurate racial identification in-
formation could only be material for those who actually received a
positive benefit. By definition, other individuals would receive no affirma-
tive action benefit; hence, their race would be immaterial. For example, a
White individual identifying as Asian American (assuming that no benefit
accrued) would not have made a material misrepresentation. The same
should arguably result if a Black individual, or other program-preference-
eligible individual, declared themselves White.
The problem is magnified many-fold when racial identity informa-
tion is collected and included in various bureaucratic records-as part of a
paper identity, for example. Given that personal record information is
used for a multitude of purposes, sometimes even without the individual's
knowledge, how could one predict materiality at the time that race in-
formation is provided? In fact, an individual who is a racial minority
might purposefully provide false information or engage in passing in or-
der to prevent the misuse of racial identity information and to avoid racial
discrimination.
1 5 2
For the Decennial Census, self-identification is the touchstone for
racial classification. It seems to be unconcerned with objective accuracy
or consistency of racial designations. Nevertheless, that same data is used
by federal agencies to monitor compliance with federal anti-
discrimination laws and to distribute federal finds to various communi-
ties. In such situations, accuracy of racial identification may be desirable,
yet not be material in a fraud inquiry.
3. The Taint of the History of Racial Fraud
Reliance on fraud doctrine to address problems of racial mis-
identifications raises one further concern: the moral taint of the infamous
history of racial fraud doctrine. During segregation and slavery, enforce-
ment of the color line was necessary to maintaining the system of
power and privilege for Whites. Laws setting out rights and disabilities
based on race covered all aspects of life.1 13 They included prohibitions on
152. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Nego-
tiations, 104 HtAuv. L. REV. 817 (1991).
153. See, e.g., PAULI MURRAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 478 (1950); Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull describing Black
Codes).
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misrepresentations of one's racial identity, enforceable in civil and criminal
proceedings. Fraud doctrine supplied the applicable law and remedy in
private transactions.
Misrepresentations as to race, when made with respect to a person
or organization that had a policy of doing business with Whites only, al-
lowed the voiding of contracts.5 4 Racial misrepresentations resulted in the
voiding of agreements for interment in a Whites-only cemetery,'5 for
life-insurance provided by an all-White benevolent association,1 16 and for
conveyance of property subject to a racially restrictive covenant. 1 7 As one
Louisiana court observed, "[t]o any tribunal of justice familiar with social
conditions and the customs of the White people in the Southern States of
this country, there can be no doubt that this is sufficient cause to vitiate
[a] contract."' 5
Interracial marriages resulting from racial misrepresentations were
void or could be annulled pursuant to the antimiscegenation laws of
many states.1 9 Fraudulent concealment of non-White racial ancestry
could also serve as a defense to lawsuits seeking to enforce promises to
marry and probate claims.1 ° States like Virginia attached independent
criminal penalties to false statements made with respect to one's racial
identity.'
61
Given its past use to support slavery and segregation, is it appropriate
to rely on racial fraud doctrine today? The argument is a variation of a
common one asserted by those arguing for formal color-blindness-
because racial classification was used for evil then, its use is evil now
154. See, e.g., Pick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 13 La.App. 525, 532 (La. App.
1930).
155. Forrest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n v. De Jarnette, 250 R 581 (Cal. Ct. App.
1926).
156. Aubert v.Thibodeaux Benevolent Ass'n, 6 La. App. 569, (1st Cir. 1927).
157. Lee v. Hansberry, 10 N.E.2d 406 (1937).
158. Aubert, 6 La. App. at 569.
159. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 295-297. See, e.g., Sunseri v. Cassavagne, 191 La. 209,
185 So. 1 (1938).
160. Van Houten v. Morse, 38 N.E. 705 (1894) (promise to marry); In re Monks'
Estate, 120 P.2d 167 (1941) (probate).There were mitigatin, doctrines. For example, when
an individual had "always been regarded as members of the White race and ... associated
with persons of that race," annulment was not to be granted on the basis of misrepresenta-
tion of the defendant's Whiteness unless "all the evidence adduced leaves no room for
doubt that such is the case." Sunseri, 191 La. at 223. See also Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60
(N.C. 1910).
161. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-51 (1950), reprinted in MumRRAY, supra note 153, at
478 ("It shall be a felony for any person willfully or knowingly to make a registration
certificate false as to color or race. The willful making of a false registration or birth cer-
tificate shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for one [1] year.").
162. See, e.g., Editorial, A Color-Blind Constitution, WALL ST.J., Mar. 22,1996, at A12.
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For one thing, there is no moral or legal equivalency between the
past and the present uses of race. 163 While it was used to enforce segrega-
tion and White supremacy, today's use in affirmative action and
desegregation is designed to counteract the effects of past and ongoing
discrimination. It functions directly contrary to its purposes in the past.
Others have suggested that policing racial designations is a necessary
evil.16 4 Even if there may be difficulties at the margins, it is arguably an
appropriate tool to prevent large-scale opportunism.
But what if one looks beyond the case of the Malone brothers and
the problem of opportunism by Whites? What about racial fraud by oth-
ers? In the desegregation decree involving the San Francisco Unified
School District, Chinese Americans have been especially affected. Over
the decade following the entry of the consent decree, changing popula-
tion demographics made Chinese-American students the largest ethnic
group in the system. These demographics were most felt at Lowell High
School, San Francisco's premier academically selective high school.
Admission to Lowell High School was based on an index derived
from both middle school grades and standardized test scores. In order to
maintain the consent decree's cap on the proportion of any one eth-
nic/racial group at Lowell High School, Chinese-American students had
to achieve index scores higher than all other ethnic and racial groups to
be admitted, including Whites. In 1995, the lowest index score that
would have admitted a Chinese-American student was 3 points higher
than for Whites. 66 This prompted some to call the admissions policy "af-
firmative action for Whites.'
'167
Herein lies the problem. What if a Chinese American parent desig-
nated her child's race as White or, for that matter, any other race listed?
Doing so would have increased the chance to be admitted to Lowell High
School; in fact, if the child's index score had been above the cut-off for
the other relevant racial/ethnic groups, it would have guaranteed admis-
sion.
Would this constitute racial fraud? Like the Malones, they would
have misrepresented their race in order to maximize the chances of ob-
taining a particular benefit rather than to express a good faith belief about
their race. But then again, Fred Korematsu and Anatole Broyard would
163. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (Stevens,J., dissenting)
("difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat").
164. See, e.g., Noley, supra note 13;Wright, supra note 42.
165. David Levine, The Chinese American Challenge to Court-mandated Quotas in San
Francisco's Public Schools: Notes from a (Partisan) Participant-Observer, 16 HAsv. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 39, 56 n.100 (2000).
166. Nanette Asimov, A Hard Lesson in Diversity: Chinese-Americans Fight Lowells Ad-
missions Policy, S.F CHRON.,June 19, 1995, at Al.
167. Levine, supra note 165, at 59 n.100 (quotingJoan Walsh, Can This Man Fix Our
Schools?, S.E Focus, Oct. 1993, at 135).
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have failed the Malone test as well. Should one compare the act of a Chi-
nese parent designating their child as White with the desires of Korematsu
and Broyard to become White to avoid discrimination? Or would it be
objectionable simply because it would undermine an important govern-
ment program, especially one intended to remedy the present vestiges of
past and the effects of ongoing forms of discrimination?16 At a minimum,
these issues raise questions about whether racial fraud is an appropriate
way of evaluating such acts.
C. The Contingency of Racial Identity
in Social Context and over Time
Choice and fraud have different strengths and weaknesses in their
ability to address the role that race and identity play in our society. How-
ever, there is one significant short-coming of both: they are premised on
the idea that racial identity can be fixed-that it is static and singular.
Both assume that there is one "true" identity that an individual has, an
identity that can be ascertained just like most type of facts. Fraud doctrine
is fairly explicit in this by asking questions about whether the racial iden-
tification matches with an objective set of criteria, such as physical
phenotype or consistent public actions.
Instead of attempting to judge the outcome and whether it is objec-
tively correct, a choice approach focuses on the process of racial
identification as the means of finding a "true" identity. Choice re-centers
the locus of classification from one that is externally imposed to one in-
ternally selected. Allowing a particular individual to choose the "correct"
identity for him or herself is deemed to make the result more accurate.
Everyday experience, however, demonstrates that identity is contex-
tual and changes over time. 169 I am all at once a father, son, teacher, and
168. See also Amber Arellano, MSU Sees Tension among Minorities, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
April 21, 1993, at 1A (Asian-Pacific and Hispanic students at Michigan State University
threatened in 1993 to identify themselves as White).
Since 2001, racial identification has been optional and race per se has not been used
to assign students due to a 1994 equal protection challenge by several Chinese American
students. They objected primarily to the race-balancing admissions decisions for Lowell
High School. San Francisco NAACP, 59 F Supp.2d at 1036-1037 (modifying the consent
decree). However, more recently the consent decree monitor, school officials, and other
parties to the case have suggested that the use of race and ethnicity in school assignments
be revisited because of alarming re-segregation patterns and an increasing achievement gap
between minority groups.JeffChorney, Old Problem Returning to Old Case, THE RECORDER,
Nov. 10, 2004, at 1.
169. See, e.g., DEREK P~auFrT, REAsONs AND PERSONS 302-306 (1984); David S. Oder-
berg,Johnston on Human Beings, 86J. PHIL. 137 (1989). See also DAVID HUME,A TREATISE OF
HuMAN NATURE 635 (1888) ("If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole
only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever
discoverable by human understanding. We only feel a connexion.").
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student. These identities are not all relevant at the same time and in all
places. Some of them appear contradictory. The particular social context
and setting is critical to determining which identity is the appropriate one
used to describe me. Being with my parents triggers a different role than
when I am with my daughterjust as the law students in my course invoke
a different identity than my language tutor.
One can view each of these identities as just an aspect of my self.
They are not exclusive of each other because different parts are perceived
in different settings. If one views identity as the part of the self that is
publicly perceived, however, then my identity changes also from one so-
cial context to another.170
This is particularly relevant to racial identity. Since racial identity is a
social, political, and legal construct, it acquires meaning only in the con-
text of a particular set of social relationships. Changes in social context
can change that identity.'. For example, Black racial identity and how it is
created through rules such as hypo-descent has meaning only in the con-
text of the maintenance of a racial caste system and the superiority of
Whites over other races.
17 2
The very idea of passing is an indication of the significance of social
context. For example, some African Americans passed as White only "dur-
ing the workday, nine to five, while presenting themselves as African
American in their private lives."'' 73 At work, they were White, at home
Black. For mixed race individuals, identification may also vary with mul-
tiple racial communities, depending on the company they are in.
Racial identity may also change over time. 74 An individual who has
always passed for White, but one day decides to reveal his "true" racial
identity, has effectively changed his or her identity. Such acts encompass
efforts of individuals like Anatole Broyard who voluntarily choose to cross
the color line on a permanent basis, as well as those like Susie Phipps and
law professor Gregory Williams who were thrust across the color line in-
voluntarily. Their racial identity changed not only in terms of how they
perceived themselves or how they wished others to perceive them. Their
170. See, e.g., EDMONSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 19; MARY C. WATERs, ETHNIC OP-
TIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA (1990); Jonathan Y Okamura, Situational Ethnicity,
4 EHNIC & RACIAL STUD 452 (1981).
171. See, e.g., Piper, supra note 138. Maybe, the contingency of racial identity on so-
cial context is illustrated best by a fictional Langston Hughes short story. In Who is Passing
for Who, Hughes wrote about White Iowans who were able to pass as "Black" by asserting
that they were colored individuals "passing for White." HUGHES, supra note 43.
172. See supra, discussion at I(C). See also Estelle T. Lau, Can Money hiten? Exploring
Race Practice in Colonial Venezuela and Its Implications for Contemporary Race Discourse, 3
MICH. J. RACE & L. 417 (1998); Darryl Fears, People of Color Who Never Felt They Were
Black: Racial Label Surprises Many Latino Immigrants, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
173. KENNEDY, supra note 22, at 289-290 (citing White by Day ... Negro by Night,
EBoNY,April 1952); see also Harris, supra note 19.
174. EDMONSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 42-43.
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community and the rest of society did in fact perceive them differently.17I
Ultimately, identity is not static and singular. Neither is racial identity.
Neither choice nor fraud are adequate frameworks for understand-
ing acts of racial identification. In the following section of this paper I will
explore a better fitting description.
III. A FUNCTIONAL UNDERSTANDING
OF RACIAL IDENTIFICATION
The primary difficulty of evaluating the accuracy of racial identity
arises out of the multiple functions of racial and ethnic identification. Its
main purposes are: 1) a physically descriptive typology; 2) an expression of
a sense of belonging to a particular racial or ethnic community; and 3) a
conclusion about the applicability of various social and/or regulatory cri-
• 176
teria. These considerations are all reflected in the racial identity test used
in Malone v. Haley. 
1 7
A. Physical Description
The most widespread and traditionally orthodox understanding of
race has been as a physically descriptive category that classifies people ac-
• . 178
cording to biological or anthropological criteria. Race is thus used as a
label for both scientifically-based as well as quasi-objective descriptions of
differences that occur naturally among human beings. Mostly the refer-
ences are to characteristics like skin color, facial features, and other
anatomical and morphological differences visible to the naked eye. How-
ever, it would also include differences at the genetic level, such as
differences in the prevalence of certain genetic markers, or so-called ge-
netic polymorphisms. 9
175. If after the discovery of the supposed Black ancestor the Malone brothers had
decided to associate more closely with the Black community, the sincerity of their claim
would clearly have been more plausible. More importantly, community views of their
racial identity might have changed. If accepted as Black by the community, they would
arguably have "become" Black under the Massachusetts test.
176. See Haney-Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, supra note 69, at 8 ("appear-
ance and ancestry, social setting, and personal action").
177. See discussion supra Part II(B)(1).
178. Gotanda, supra note 19. Neal Gotanda has distinguished this use of race further
into scientific race and formal race.
179. See, e.g., Michael J. Bamshad & Steve E. Olson, Does Race Exist?, Sci. Am., Dec.
2003, at 81.
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The hearing examiner in Malone v. Haley cast her determination of
the physically descriptive version of race as a visual observation of the
Malone brothers. But she would undoubtedly also have accepted genetic
or other scientific evidence, if available and validated, in support of their
claim.
Contemporary scientific knowledge about human genetics and bi-
ology has shown that variations within the same racial grouping exceeds
that between races.'8 ° It has become the accepted consensus that physical
differences between the races are more imagined than real.'8 ' Neverthe-
less, race continues to be utilized as a classification tool, especially in the
medical sciences. In fact, even the idea of race as a version of taxonomic
subspecies classification has not disappeared in the sciences, though its use
is controversial.
8 2
The resurgence is attributable to research arising out of the human
genome project. 113 New research suggests that racial identity is linked to
identifiable genetic polymorphisms and may be correlated with an indi-
vidual's geographical ancestral origin.8 4 Thus, some have suggested that
even in its self-identification form, racial ancestry could serve as a scien-
tifically and medically relevant predictor not only of genetic make-up and
variation, but also disease and health. 5
The proposition remains controversial. 86 However, there are well-
known examples of genetically transmitted diseases correlated with cer-
tain racial and ethnic groups, including Tay-Sachs disease and sickle cell
anemia. The link of race and ethnicity with genetic make-up has also
contributed to the development of pharmacogenomics and the tailoring
of drugs to the specific genetic make-up of particular population
187groups.
180. See generally L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, The Genetics of Human Populations, 231 Sci. Am.
80 (Sept. 1974); LEWONTIN Er AL., supra note 80.
181. See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 79; BANTON, supra note 75, at vii; G.AVEs, supra note
75, at 5-7.
182. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee & Joanna Mountain et al., The Meanings of "Race" in the New
Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YAUS J. HEALTH POL'Y. L. & ETHICs
33, 39 (2001). See also S.O.Y Keita & R.A. Kitties, et al., Conceptualizing Human Variation,
36 NATuRE GENETICS S17 (Nov. 2004).
183. See, e.g., Esteban Gonzalez Burchard et al., The Importance of Race and Ethnic
Background in Biomedical Research and Clinical Practice, 348 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1170
(2003).
184. See, e.g., Leroy, supra note 143.
185. See, e.g., Bamshad, supra note 179, at 78; Joanna L. Mountain & Neil Risch, As-
sessing Genetic Contributions to Phenotypic Differences among 'Racial' and 'Ethnic' Groups, 36
NATURE GENETICS S48 (Nov. 2004).
186. See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, 2 Scholarly Articles Diverge on Role of Race in Medicine,
N.Y TIMES, Mar. 20, 2003, at A30; Richard S. Cooper, Jay S. Kaufian, & Ryk Ward, Race
and Genomics, 348 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1166 (2003).
187. Pharmacogenomics is "the study of the genetic basis for differential drug re-
sponses between individuals." Lee et al., supra note 182, at 58; Stephanie Saul, FDA
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B. Expressive Affiliation
A less orthodox function of racial identity is its expression of mem-
bership or a sense of belonging in a particular racial or ethnic community.
Racial identity expresses a person's self-definition and group member-
ship.
188
For example, Adrian Piper, Walter White, and many others in the Af-
rican American community could pass or easily be mistaken as White.
Nevertheless, they chose to associate with the African American commu-
nity, thereby expressing their affiliation and sense of belonging to that
community. In the past few decades, such acts can also be seen in the
dramatic increase in the American Indian population recorded by the
Census. Such increases have been attributed not to greater number of
births but the re-discovery of American Indian ancestry and cultural in-
terest by those who previously considered themselves White or would not
acknowledge Indian ancestry1 9 As passing also suggests, the desire to be-
long to a particular racial community may not be limited to those with
the "proper" set of ancestors. Nor need it be directed toward becoming
White.' 90
Racial identification as an expressive affiliative act is based upon the
idea that racial and ethnic groups are communities bound together by ties
of culture and common experience, including discrimination and exclu-
sion. In such communities, common physical characteristics have become
integral traits around which a community has taken shape.'91 Within
Approves a Heart Drug for African Americans, N.Y TIMES,June 24, 2005 at C2 (FDA approval
of first heart medication marketed to Blacks).
188. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDS
FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 84 (race as
a "deeply personal issue"). But see SKERv, supra note 81, at 48 (ridiculing the idea or sub-
jectivity of racial identity).
189. Dirk Johnson, Census Finds Many Claiming New Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1991, at A1; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE, supra note 71,
at 10. In fact, culturally, there are individuals who identify themselves as American Indians
who speak no native languages and have little or no familiarity with tribal culture. Politi-
cally, the latest census data provide strong indication that self-identifying Indians are far
more numerous than tribal rolls would indicate. The 1990 census counted 8.8 million
people who reported at least part American Indian ancestry and 1.8 million as being of
American Indian race. Yet according to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, tribal rolls totaled
only a little more than 1 million people at the end of 1993. EDMONSTON Er AL., supra note
32, at 30 (citing Karl Eschbach, Changing identification among American Indians and Alaskan
Natives, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 635 (1993).
190. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 42, at 517 (Stockton, California City Councilman
Mark Stebbins who claimed he was Black even though birth records identified him as
White).
191. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY & CULTURE 89 (1989); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303,
321-23 (1986); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147-154 (1982).
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Malone v. Haley, consideration of whether the Malones held themselves
out to the community as Black and the good faith nature of their belief
all reflect the expressive affiliative characteristic of racial identification.
Simply expressing a sense of belonging to a particular group, how-
ever, does not mean that one actually belongs. If it is not recognized or
accepted by other community members, it is little more than the venting
of a subjective feeling. For example, any attempt of WE.B. Dubois to
identify with his Dutch-and thus White-ancestry, would have been
ineffective. 19' In his times, a Black man would have been laughed at or
ridiculed for attempting to be accepted asWhite.
Racial lines still matter today. Rejecting the plausibility and effec-
tiveness of such an expression of affiliation, however, imagines race only as
a binary classification of Black and White that has remained untouched by
the passage of time. Even if White racial identity may have been con-
structed primarily by legal acts and social efforts of exclusion and
oppression, other racial groups have had a very different history. Asian
American racial identity, for example, has been the result of conscientious
efforts of pan-Asian cooperation and amalgamation of separate national
identities of Japanese, Chinese, Philippino, Indian, and other Asian com-
munities. A similar story might be told even about African Americans and
the creation of a Black identity from the many different tribal and na-
tional identities brought by slave ancestors from Africa.
1 93
With the passage of time, efforts to "become" White, or for that
matter any other race, have become much more plausible today than dur-
ing the times of Dubois. Popularization of ideas about the malleability
and the social construction of race have themselves worked to change
people's perceptions about the permeability of racial boundaries.1 94 Racial
identities are clearly not as inflexible and unchangeable as they might have
been a century or even just a few decades ago, even if they must continue
to work against old conceptions of race.
C. Regulatory/Social Conclusion
A third major function of racial identification is as a legal conclusion
or social judgment about the applicability of particular social and legal
criteria. These criteria do not have to include the physical characteristics
and expressive actions referred to above. Within Malone v. Haley, it
192. HICKMAN, supra note 85, at 1246-47.
193. OMI & WYNANT, supra note 69.
194. For example, in a recent TV sit-corn episode, a character with an African Ameri-
can phenotype asserted his Irish cultural heritage to the bewilderment but embarrassed
acquiescence of the show's main character. Andy Richter Controls the Universe (Fox Net-
work broadcast, "We're All the Same, Only Different, Dec. 1, 2002). Even if popular
culture is only a faint reflection of people's attitudes, the fact that such a story line aired
says much about the plausibility and acceptability of such claims.
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constituted the second prong and part of the third prong of the racial
identity test.
Race as a regulatory or social conclusion establishes social and/or
legal status independent of any physical appearance or self-recognition. 95
It is the same as legal status established, for example, by state bar admission
to practice law.While a law school graduate may have the same legal skills
before bar admission, the act of admission confers status as an attorney
licensed to practice law, thus providing new legal rights and obligations.
In the past, criteria used to determine Black or White legal or social
status included not only physical appearance and expressive acts, but also
rules of hypo-descent, 196 racial performance,
197 and common knowledge.198
These specific rules and criteria may be things of the past, but the concept
of race as a legal conclusion or social judgment has not disappeared. For
example, Malone v. Haley looked to physical characteristics, documentary
evidence, community perception, and expressive self-identification as cri-
teria for being Black for purposes of affirmative action hiring. Its most
wide-spread use, arguably, remains with respect to American Indians. Legal
status as American Indian for many governmental benefits may be de-
pendent on tribal enrollment, blood quantum, reservation residence, or
any combination of these.' 99
Apart from legal status, racial identity may also express a judgment
about a person's social status. The persistence of hypo-descent rules in
social judgments about race as well as residential segregation, discrimina-
tion in the market place, and employment discrimination-all the subjects
of various prohibitions by federal antidiscrimination laws-is illustrative. It
is a consequence of the nature of race as a construction not only of the
law but also of social practices, norms, and expectations.
2 0 0
IV. APPLYING RACIAL IDENTIFICATION FUNCTIONALLY
Neither fraud nor choice are satisfactory frameworks for under-
standing the functions of racial identification. The premise of racial fraud
is that race has a single fixed meaning susceptible of being verified. Un-
fortunately, it conflates the descriptive, expressive and conclusive functions
of racial identification. The choice perspective falsely assumes that racial
195. Neal Gotanda has referred to this as "status race." Gotanda, supra note 19, at 4.
196. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 85.
197. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 49 (asking whether the individual acted as a White
person would). See also supra Part I(C).
198. See, e.g., Thind, 261 U.S. at 214-15 (asking if "common knowledge" indicated
that individual was White).
199. Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian: Searching for an Answer to the Question at the
Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 275 (2000-2001). For an example of
eligibility criteria, see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. 345; 25 U.S.C. % 479,480.
200. See Haney-Lopez, Social Construction of Race, supra note 69.
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identity determinations are entirely subjective to an individual. But racial
designations can also be social or regulatory conclusions, independent of
and contradictory to one's self-chosen racial identity.
Racial identification is an act that must be evaluated with respect to
context and function. 20 1 I consider two specific government-related situa-
tions: 1) remedial and race-conscious programs, especially race-based
affirmative action programs and 2) the decennial federal census. In addi-
tion, I also address racial identification in health care and bureaucratic
records. For each context, I also provide suggestions of how the particular
functions of racial identification can be disaggregated.
A. Remedial and Race-Conscious Programs
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many race remedial and race-
conscious programs operate on the basis of self-identification In es
sence, they operate largely on the "honor system." In spite of the potential
for manipulation by "racial opportunists" and attendant dilution of pro-
gram purposes, there appear to be no large-scale systematic studies
examining the prevalence of opportunistic misrepresentation.
Some small studies and anecdotal evidence, including the Malone
case and other related news reporting, indicate that opportunism does
occur, and "bona fide" racial minority candidates are displaced from uni-
versity admissions, scholarship, and job opportunities.0 3 If personal choice
justifications for racial identity become more widely accepted, and if so-
cial stigma associated with some racial minority groups decreases,
individual willingness and the social acceptability of changing (or ma-
nipulating) one's racial identity may rise.
Improving the elicitation of the "correct" racial identity, however, is
not the answer to the problem. It is premised on the "wrong" question. A
more effective approach ought to focus on the purposes of affirmative
action and other race-conscious programs, thereby circumventing prob-
lems of authenticity of a person's racial identification.
For example, discrimination is a result of the use of race as a regula-
tory and social conclusion-race as status, as Neil Gotanda has described
it.2"4 Since race-based affirmative action programs are designed to remedy
past and ongoing discrimination, eligibility for program benefits should
201. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race,
12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 21 (1985) (repudiating notion of race).
202. See, e.g., Telephone interviews by Jeffrey Allmon with undergraduate admissions
officers at Harvard University, Dartmouth College, Stanford University, University of Ore-
gon, and the University of Kansas, July 28 - August 1, 2005 (on file with author). Only
Stanford had a verification policy, though officials would not divulge it in order to main-
tain its effectiveness. Id.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
204. Gotanda, supra note 19, at 3-5.
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not be based only on the applicant's self-identified racial identity. Self-
identified race can, truthfully and sincerely, reflect not only racial status,
but also physical characteristics and expressive affiliative desires. Instead, it
would be more appropriate to inquire into the individual's experience or
205
relationship with racial discrimination.
Racial identity requirements in race conscious programs, such as di-
versity-based university admissions, could be treated similarly. One might
ask whether the particular applicant has experienced significant amounts
of discrimination as an African American, Asian American, Latino, or
other racial minority as well as other relevant specific racial or ethnic ex-
periences. Rather than relying on racial self-identification as a purported
proxy for experiences of discrimination and culture, and having to "hope"
for the best-that those choices are in fact authentic, sincere, and not op-
portunistic-it would be more effective to ask directly about relevant
experiences.
Determining program eligibility in this fashion would not alter the
substantive basis and design of any race-remedial or race-conscious pro-
gram, including whether it was designed to respond to a documented
history of past discrimination by an institution or based on a forward-
looking rationale. A functional analysis, however, would take a more nu-
anced view of why race may be more than a simple description of a
person's physical characteristics. It could articulate why racial identity can
be a relevant difference for strict scrutiny purposes. 206 With respect to univer-
sity diversity admissions programs, disaggregating racial identity into its
relevant functions would improve the narrow-tailoring of the use of
207
race.
The process of determining program eligibility would require far
more individualized determinations and thus be more complicated and
time-consuming than requesting a one- or two-word racial identity. But
in the university admissions context, it would be no different from the
processes and criteria that diversity admissions programs already rely
upon. Its benefit with respect to traditional racial affirmative action pro-
grams would be to emphasize that affirmative action is less a function of
pure racial status and more of racial experience with discrimination.
In most instances, there should be little difference in the outcome
between orthodox requests for racial identity (the identity perceived by
205. One might think of experiences of having lived in a racial ghetto, being the
subject of racial stereotyping, or overcoming disadvantages commonly associated with
racial minority status. Claims or experiences of reverse discrimination by Whites would be
fundamentally different in nature and relevance. Even though they would relevant for
general diversity purposes, sinuilar to special musical talent or experiences with foreign
cultures, they would not have arisen out of a system of exclusion and caste in which race
is a proxy for status. See discussion in section I(C).
206. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228.
207. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-35 (2003).
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the particular individual) and functional questions about experiences tied
to racial status (the social and legal effects of racial identity as it is ascribed
by others) .When there is divergence, however, the program-eligible set of
individuals would be reduced. Given anecdotal observations of box-
checking, that is likely to be true for American Indians, some of whom
have had little connection to the Native American community, as well as
for the muddled definition of Hispanics/Latinos.
Finally, this type of inquiry would also explicitly recognize the con-
tingency and malleability of racial identity across context and time,
including among different government programs. For example, it could
provide a clearer articulation of why an individual ought to qualify for
protection or benefits under one government program but not another.
Even if both use the same generic racial identity term, due to their di-
verging purposes they might utilize different criteria and come to
different regulatory/social conclusions about racial identity. 208 Focusing
explicitly on the functional purposes of these programs could avoid what
209
would appear to be contradictory uses of race.
Understanding race as a social or regulatory conclusion acknowl-
edges that it remains a socially constructed concept referring to criteria
beyond notions of physical description or expressive affiliation. It does not
require reliance only on notions of hypo-descent and other odious classi-
fication rules dating from times of officially sanctioned racism. Instead, it
allows the utilization of a social concept appropriate to the present-day.
B. The Census and Vital Statistics
The racial and ethnic classifications utilized by the Census are gov-
erned by Directive 15 of the Office of Management and Budget
208. Of course, one could also continue to use race as before, but define it explicitly
by reference to specific criteria. Such definitions might be based on the experiences, dis-
crimination and culture specific to each racial group. The outcome should theoretically be
no different. However, it might introduce additional issues of consistency and create new
openings for insincerity and opportunism. For a general example, see Tanya Kateri Her-
nandez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classification in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57
MD. L. REv. 97, 167-169 (1998).
209. In other words, as Richard Delgado has pointed out to me, it would avoid the
seeming contradiction when an individual might be considered a minority for some gov-
ernment programs but not others. For example, racial identity might reasonably be
construed more narrowly for affirmative action purposes than for anti-discrimination
protections. Thus, the Malone brothers should not have benefited from the affirmative
action decree of the Boston Fire Department. However, if they had become the subject of
racial bigotry or violence because some White supremacists believed the assertions of a
Black ancestor, they should be able to invoke the protections of the anti-discrimination
laws. A functional approach would expose that the contradiction is an artifact of the
poorly defined and over-broad usage of racial identity terms rather than a contradiction in
concept and use.
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(OMB).2 10 In 1997, OMB changed the racial classifications used by agen-
cies, including the US Census Bureau.21 The process and the subsequent
changes have given rise to plenty of controversy and criticism by com-
mentators,212 such as persisting inconsistencies in how racial categories are
defined, ambiguities in terminology, and other serious flaws in racial cate-
gory delineations. I do not intend to duplicate those more comprehensive
critiques, especially given the limited scope of this Article. A functional
understanding of racial identification, however, does indicate a couple of
points relevant to the post-1997 classification system.
On the problem of racial identification, the federal Census proceeds
from a perspective that is almost exactly the opposite of that relied upon
in the affirmative action setting. In redesigning the federal racial classifica-
tion system, OMB has explicitly acknowledged the socially constructed
nature of racial identity.2 13 OMB and the Census Bureau have also stated
that racial classifications are principally within the choice of a particular
individual.2 4 However, there are many situations when racial identity is
assigned by the Census.
In most instances, assignments of racial identity are imputations of
race, primarily due to reasons of administrative convenience. Usually, they
are intended to be a substitute for the individual's supposed choice, rather
than a contravention of it.215 In some instances, however, such assignments
run directly, and deliberately, contrary to the actual choices made. The
reasons have primarily been manageability and efficiency considerations.
The Census choice offerings are limited and unable to accommodate the
full range of perception and imagination that exist within the population.
The most troubling issues arise when racial identity assignments conflate
race as expressive affiliation with race as a social and regulatory conclu-
sion. That has arguably occurred with the Census compilation of
multiracial data.
Prior to the 2000 Census, complaints by the multiracial movement
focused attention on the inadequacies of the existing scheme. It forcedS 216
multiracial individuals to identify themselves incorrectly as mono-racial.
In other words, the requirement of designating a mono-racial identity was
210. OMB has authority over record-keeping and paper work by federal agencies.
211. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PEVISIONS TO THE STANDARDS FOR THE
CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY, supra note 84.
212. For criticisms of the revised racial classification system of the 2000 decennial
Census, see Toro, supra note 71; Ford, supra note 21; Hernandez, supra note 208; SKERRY,
supra note 81.
213. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDS FOR THE
CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY supra note 84, at 58788.
214. Id. at 58789.
215. SKERRY, supra note 81, at 49-50.
216. Susan Graham, The Real World, in THE MULTIRACIAL EXPERIENCE: RACIAL BOR-
DERS AS THE NEW FRONTIER 37 (Maria PP Root, ed., 1996).
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inadequate in allowing such individuals to express their sense of racial
affiliation.217 The 2000 Census questionnaire compromise allowed multi-
ple box-checking as a way of indicating multiple racial heritages and
expressing more accurately a distinctive sense of identity.
However, the change is deceptive in its accommodation of multira-
cial individuals. Instead of forcing individuals to choose just one category,
the Census now assigns a mono-racial category to individuals who check
more than one category.With respect to those who have some White an-
cestry, the process utilizes essentially one rule to process multiple race
choices for federal program purposes.218 According to OMB Bulletin 00-
02, any individual who has selected a combination of White and one or
more minority races is classified as one of the minority races.219
With respect to the implementation of federal anti-discrimination
programs and monitoring by civil rights advocacy organizations, the pri-
mary reason for this policy can be found in the data needs of the federal
220government. Such data needs cannot rely on the aspirational racial self-
perception of individuals. Instead, as the rules applied by the Census to
multiracial responses indicate, it requires information about the racial
identity that is perceived by those who can potentially or have actually
discriminated against that particular individual.
The practical effect is to create a second racial identity for multira-
cial individuals, albeit in a confused and ambiguous fashion. The first is
the individual's self-perceived identity, one designated by the particular
individual that accommodates expressive affiliative purposes.The second is
an other-ascribed identity that is mono-racial in nature and that is created
by the Census based on criteria reflecting popular perceptions about race,
including rules of hypo-descent. If one takes both the expressive
affiliative aspect of racial identification and the data needs of the federal
217. Critics of the multiracial movement have argued that many of the advocates are
more concerned with opting out of racial stigma than with a true sense of distinct racial
identity. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 208; see also JON MICHAEL SPENCER, THE NEw
COLORED PEOPLE: THE MIXED-RACE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1997). For the off-spring of
White and racial minority unions, especially White and Black parents, critics have sug-
gested that a multiracial category is primarily intended to pass along some amount of
White privilege. After all, a very high proportion of the population classified as African
American or Black is in fact multi-racial as a result of slavery. By some accounts, about
thirty percent of the African American population has European paternal ancestry. See
Amy Harmon, Blacks Pin Hope on DNA to Fill Slavery's Gaps in Family Trees, N.Y TIMES,
July 25, 2005, at Al.
218. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OMB BULLETIN 00-02: GUIDANCE ON
AGGREGATION AND ALLOCATION OF MULTIPLE RACE RESPONSES FOR USE IN CIVIL RIGHTS
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT, Mar. 9, 2000.
219. Id. at 4; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE, supra
note 71, at 63, 67, 71-72.
220. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OMB BULLETIN 00-02, supra note 218.
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anti-discrimination programs seriously, this approach seems half-baked
and half-hearted.
First, the approach manages to introduce new inconsistencies in
how racial identity is determined. The 2000 Census questionnaire explic-
itly states that individuals are permitted to check multiple race boxes.
Persons may mark "one or more races to indicate what this person con-
siders himself/herself to be' 221 For individuals who are self-aware and
mindfiul of their multiracial status, the expressive affiliative nature of the
racial identification question is thus made obvious.
For most others, including individuals unaware of their multi-racial
ancestry, self-perceived racial identity will coincide with other-ascribed
identity. In asking for "what this person considers himself/herself to be," the
question does not specify the criteria on which "this person" should base
his or her choice. While the question does allow for an expressive affilia-
tive choice, it can also easily be interpreted as requiring the application of
prevailing social or quasi-legal criteria, including the one-drop rule. For
many racial minorities, especially most African Americans, prevailing per-
ceptions about hypo-descent and other rules of racial classification may
readily trigger, and be perceived as requiring, a response of racial identity as
a social or legal conclusion rather than as an act of expressive affiliation.
Second, this approach complicates the racial classification process by
adding a new layer of rules to determinations of racial identity. However,
the rules are of dubious value to the extent that they are mere restate-
ments about racial stereotypes and import rules of classification originally
designed for racist purposes.
Instead of such race-assignment algorithms, the simplest and best
source of information about other-perceived identity of the particular
individual himself/herself should be utilized.The Census understands that
the individual has the best and most complete information about which
racial group they feel the greatest sense of belonging. The individual usu-
ally also has the most complete information about how their racial
identity is perceived by others. A second question to that effect would
obviate the Census dilemma. The Census could request both self-
perceived (aspirational) and other-perceived racial identity information
from individuals.222
Implementing such perspectives would be relatively straight-forward.
Undoubtedly, it would also raise concerns about cost, administrative effi-
ciency in data collection, and the significant limits to the changes that can
221. 2000 Census Form D-2, Question 6 states: "What is this person's race?
Mark X one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to
be." (emphasis in original).
222. Requesting information both about an individual's expressive affiliative identity
and social/regulatory conclusion identity would likely clarify the disparity between the
large number of individuals claiming some American Indian ancestry and the significantly
smaller number of individuals claiming some formal tribal affiliation.
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be made to the Census questionnaire format. However, if one takes the
problem of racial identification seriously, it is unlikely that an effective
solution will be simple or available on the cheap.
C. Private/Informal Use of Racial Identity
What about racial identification questions that arise outside of gov-
ernmental programs? While there is significantly less regulation of racial
identification, the marketplace and private social institutions are also af-
fected by these issues. Federal and state anti-discrimination laws require
government contractors, federal funds recipients, and other private entities
to monitor racial populations for implementation and enforcement pur-
poses. Moreover, traditional common law fraud principles, as applied in
Malone v. Haley, can give rise to racial identification disputes.
Given the limited analytical scope of this Article, a comprehensive
prescription as to how race should be used in a color-blind society is
more than what I can adequately provide. Nevertheless, there are some
things that can be said with respect to issues related to bureaucratic re-
cords and health care.
Misrepresentations in the civil context, in particular with respect to
bureaucratic records, are commonplace. The pervasive use and reliance on
bureaucratic records in the marketplace, in social institutions, and gov-
ernmental processes has created many new occasions for individuals to
mis-state their racial identity or to create a false paper identity.
In most of these contexts, civil rights laws prohibit racial discrimina-
tion. Accordingly, with the exception of race-remedial programs, most
racial identity designations should be irrelevant. Any "misrepresentation"
ought to be immaterial to the transaction. Alternatively, one could also
"justify" a racial identity "misrepresentation" by using a person's sense of
belonging as well as their social interactions and recognition.
Unfortunately, this creates difficulties for civil rights monitoring and
enforcement. Detection and responses to racial discrimination and moni-
toring of compliance with federal civil rights laws depend in part on
racial identity data reported by employers, financial institution, and other
organizations. Misreporting could significantly undermine such efforts.
For example, to the extent that racial minorities were to designate
"White," the data could suggest that discrimination against racial minori-
ties has lessened even if the institutions had done nothing different.
There seems to be little that could be done. Like traditional self-
identification, such information requests remains vulnerable to outright
and intentional misrepresentation. Moreover, fraud doctrine would seem
of little help. Given that the racial identity information would not be a
condition of nor linked to any benefit received, any misinformation could
not be deemed material in a fraud analysis.
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Instead, requesting functional information with respect to racial
identity could reduce ambiguity and improve accuracy of responses. Thus,
to the extent that racial identity is relevant to experiences of discrimina-
tion, it would be most useful to collect information about other-ascribed
identity, i.e. the individual's identity as socially perceived by others. Since
the discriminator's perception of the target's racial identity is rarely available
directly from the discriminator, asking how potential discrimination tar-
gets are perceived is the next-closest approximation. This form of the
question would convert it from one with three possibly legitimate an-
swers into one simpler, fact-driven question-"how do others perceive
your racial identity?
23
There is also one other distinct advantage. Requesting an individual
to provide information about their perceived racial identity exposes the
contingency of identity. It explicitly allows for and anticipates different
answers in different contexts-an explicit recognition of the context and
time-dependency of racial identity. This form of the question accommo-
dates the reality that one's identity is not the same everywhere and at
every time, especially since levels of racial integration and perceptions of
racial identity differ in regard to geographic locales and social institutions.
At the same time, it also accounts for changes in race relations and racial
perceptions over time, with accompanying effect on individual identity.
What about the use of racial identity labels in health care? Such use
continues to be wide-spread, especially when monitoring and studying
public health and diseases. However, given the overwhelming scientific
consensus that genetic variations within racial groups are much greater
than between racial groups, is there still a legitimate need for "accurate"
racial identification?
When racial disparities and discrimination in the delivery of health
224care services are at issue, such racial identity labels are arguably not only
legitimate but necessary. As in the study of other contexts of discrimina-
tion, racial identity as a social or regulatory conclusion describes how
others judge the individual's race and relates identity to how the individ-
ual is treated.
The use of racial identity in the scientific research-oriented areas of
health care and medical sciences, as a means of cataloging disease preva-
lence among different population groups, for example, is more
troubling. Its functions as labels expressing a sense of belonging or as a
223. Again, in most situations, when the individual's appearance conforms with many
of the popularly associated characteristics of a particular racial group, the answer to this
question should not diverge significantly from contemporary answers to a traditional self-
identification question, such as "What is your race?." This may not necessarily be true in
the future.
224. See, e.g., David R. Williams, Race, Health and Health Care, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 13
(2003).
225. Lee et al., supra note 182, at 65-66.
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social or legal conclusion are irrelevant. The only legitimate use of race is
as a physical description, a label for geographical ancestral population
groups linked to the prevalence of certain genetic polymorphisms.12 6 It
has been discredited as a descriptor of other fundamental physiological or
biological differences.
In its nature, however, genetic polymorphisms cannot be perceived
with the unaided senses but requires sophisticated genetic tests. Such ge-
netic information is not yet available on a large-scale basis. Thus, any
particular racial identity furnished by a patient or medical research subject
is likely to be based on discredited notions of physiological differences or
stereotypical views about racial appearances, a sense of racial group be-
'27longing, or the application of social and legal criteria. In short, any
racial identity information will often be irrelevant or misleading to the
fact-driven scientific endeavor.
Moreover, the correlation of racial ancestry with particular genetic
markers, is not exact. In other words, genes and biology do not necessarily
predict disease, behavior, or other consequences. In fact, the contribution
of environmental factors to health and disease susceptibility is significant,
- - 2281
but is not easily quantified or separated from genetic contributions.
There is also a danger of the renewed use of ancestral origin ver-
sions of race to popular discourse about race. The words may be the same,
but the meanings are not.The increased use of such terminology creates a
temptation to import scientific race terminology into popular debate. The
result might only be confusion, but also the risk of "conflating biology
and culture."
229
Wide-spread testing for genetic polymorphisms and increased avail-
ability of such information for each individual could arguably allow for
more accurate use of racial ancestry labels. Apart from privacy concerns,
considerations of cost and practicability, and genetic reductionism ,230 how-
ever, such a solution would be round-about and inept. After all, the racial
identity label would be used as a proxy for possible genetic differences. To
the extent that direct information about relevant genetic markers is avail-
able and relevant to the researcher's investigation, obfuscating the presence
or absence of particular genetic markers by reverting back to racial iden-
tity labels seems counter-productive.
Instead, as Sandra Soo-Tin Lee, Joanna Mountain, and Barbara A.
Koenig have suggested, "individualized research and practice" would be
226. Bamshad & Olson, supra note 179; see also Lee et al., supra note 182, at 58-60.
227. Identification of the individual's race by a third-party will fare no better since
the same constraints apply.
228. Sarah K. Tate & David B. Goldstein, Will Tomorrow's Medicines Work for Everyone?,
36 NATuRE GENETICS S34 (Nov. 2004). See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 182, at 34.
229. Lee et al., supra note 182, at 54. The authors also suggest that the concept mis-
guides researchers.
230. Id. at 63-64.
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far more effective.2' Rather than carelessly using the prevailing racial
identity labels in medical research studies, health care professionals and
research would be better served, and could serve the ultimate beneficiaries
of the research better, by classifying individuals in accordance with rele-
vant genetic differences. It would "save us from the tautological quandary
of searching for differences in places where they are expected, thus reify-
ing the idea of racial difference and ignoring the true range of genetic
variation across the human population.',
232
This advice is arguably applicable more broadly to situations when
public institutions, such as law enforcement authorities, continue to use
racial identity labels as a proxy for visible physical features that are pur-
portedly distinctive to individuals of particular racial groups. That is not to
suggest that racial identity labels may never have a place in research, such
233
as in designating geographic ancestral populations. However, their con-
tinued careless use without regard to meaning and function perpetually
resurrects discredited ideas of racial difference. It directs us away from real
differences and distinguishing features between individuals that are the
true object of study or description.
CONCLUSION
The dilemma of policing the accuracy of racial identifications arises
out of the connection between the past, the present, and the future. The
use of racial identity labels arguably contributes to the perpetuation of
racial stereotypes and the continued salience of race. Yet, prohibiting the
use of racial identity labels and ignoring prejudice and discrimination will
not make them disappear. The very persistence of discrimination creates a
need for a tool to monitor and redress its effects.
Unfortunately, methodologies relying on conclusive self-
identification (choice) or objective/third-party determination (fraud) have
not proven to be satisfactory as methods for ensuring accuracy. A func-
tional approach that distinguishes between physically descriptive,
expressive affiliative, and social/regulatory conclusive meanings avoids
these deficiencies.
In many instances there will not be a significant difference between
existing racial identification practices and what I propose here. However,
evolving public views of race, changes in race relations, and the growing
multi-cultural and mixed race make-up of our nation will gradually in-
231. Id. at 64.
232. Id. at 65.
233. In fact, to the extent that racial identity labels or categories are used as scientific
terms of art with specifically defined meanings and explicitly and carefully distinguished
from their popular counterparts and uses, the concerns raised by the popular use of racial
identity labels does not arise.
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crease the number of occasions when existing racial identification and
classification schemes will be inadequate. Focusing on the function and
meaning of the racial identification process is one way of making racial
identity appropriate for our times. Perhaps most importantly, it is a way of
articulating the continued legitimacy and need for the consideration of
race issues by public and governmental institutions without getting
trapped in some of the pitfalls of today's politics of race.
